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Abstract
We consider the problems of allocating several heterogeneous objects owned by gov-
ernments to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at
most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Nonquasi-linear preferences de-
scribe environments in which large-scale payments in°uence agents' abilities to utilize
objects or derive bene¯ts from them. The \minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule" is
the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each pref-
erence pro¯le. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule that satis¯es the
desirable properties of strategy-proofness, Pareto-e±ciency, individual rationality, and
nonnegative payment on the domain that includes nonquasi-linear preferences. This
result does not only recommend the MPW rule based on those desirable properties, but
also suggest that governments cannot improve upon the MPW rule once they consider
them essential. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simulta-
neous ascending (SA) auction, our result explains the pervasive use of the SA auction.
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1 Introduction
Purpose. Since the 1990s, governments in numerous countries have conducted auctions
to allocates a variety of heterogeneous objects or assets including spectrum rights, vehicle
ownership licenses, and lands, etc. Although auction revenues sometimes amount to even
as large as government annual budgets, the announced goals of many government auctions
are rather to allocate objects \e±ciently", i.e., to agents who make the most use of them or
bene¯t most from them.1 Agents making more use of objects or bene¯ting more are willing to
pay higher prices for them, and thus would have more chances to win the objects in auctions.
However, large-scale auction payments would in°uence agents' abilities to utilize objects or
bene¯t from them, thereby complicating e±cient allocation. This article analyzes rules that
allocate auctioned objects e±ciently even when payments are so large that it impairs agents'
abilities to utilize them or realize their bene¯ts. We ask what types of allocation rules can
allocate objects e±ciently in such environments.
Main Result. An allocation rule (or simply a rule) is a function that assigns to each
agents' preference pro¯le an allocation, which consists of an assignment of objects and agents'
payments. Each agent is permitted to receive one object at the most. The domain of rules
is the class of agents' preference pro¯les. It is well-known that in this model, there is a
minimum price Walrasian equilibrium,2 and that its allocation coincides with the outcome
of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction.3 We focus on the rule that assigns a minimum
price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference pro¯le. We refer to this rule as the
\minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule".
The MPW rule satis¯es four desirable properties. The ¯rst is Pareto-e±ciency. An
allocation is Pareto-e±cient if no agent can be better o® without making other agents worse
o® or reducing a government's revenue.4 Note that Pareto-e±ciency is evaluated based on
agents' preferences. Thus, a Pareto-e±cient allocation cannot be chosen without information
about agents' preferences. Since preferences are private information, agents have incentives
to behave strategically to in°uence the ¯nal outcome in their favor. Strategy-proofness is an
incentive-compatibility property, which gives a strong incentive for each agent to reveal his
true preferences. It says that in the normal form game induced by the rule, it is a (weakly)
dominant strategy for each agent to reveal his true preference. The MPW rule satis¯es
strategy-proofness,5 and chooses a Pareto-e±cient allocation corresponding to the revealed
preferences.
Third property is individual rationality, that induces agents's voluntary participation.
The MPW rule never assigns an allocation that makes an agent worse o® than he would be
if he had received no object and paid nothing. Fourth is nonnegative payment. Under the
MPW rule, agents' payments are always nonnegative, that is, governments never subsidize
agents.
The primary conclusion of this article is that only the minimum price Walrasian rule sat-
1For example, frequency auctions in the United States were introduced to promote \e±cient and intensive
use of the electromagnetic spectrum". See McAfee and McMillan (1996, p.160).
2See Demange and Gale (1985).
3For example, see Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986).
4In our auction model, Pareto-e±ciency is de¯ned by taking government revenue into account.
5In addition, the MPW rule satis¯es group strategy-proofness, i.e., by misrepresenting their preferences,
no group of agents should obtain assignments that they prefer.
2
is¯es strategy-proofness, Pareto-e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment
in environments where large-scale payments in°uence agents' abilities to utilize the objects or
enjoy their bene¯ts(Theorem 5.1). This result does not only recommend the MPW rule based
on the four desirable properties, but also implies that no other rules are available options
once governments consider the four properties as essential. Since the outcome of the MPW
rule coincides with that of the SA auction, the result also supports SA auctions adopted by
many governments.
Novelties and technical di±culties. HolmstrÄom (1979) establishes a fundamental
result relating to our question that applies when agents' bene¯ts from auctioned objects are
not in°uenced by their payments, i.e., agents have \quasi-linear" preferences. He assumes
that the domain includes only quasi-linear preference, and shows that only the Vickrey{
Clarke{Groves type (VCG)6 allocation rules satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto-e±ciency.7
Preferences are approximately quasi-linear if payments are su±ciently low. However, quasi-
linearity is not an appropriate assumption for large-scale auctions. Excessive payment for
the auctioned objects may damage bidders' budgets and render e®ective use of the objects
impossible. In fact, in spectrum license auctions and vehicle ownership license auctions,
license prices often equal or exceed bidders' annual revenues. Thus, bidders' preferences are
nonquasi-linear for such important auctions.8 As contrasted with HolmstrÄom (1979), our
result can be applied even to such environments.
Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) investigate a problem similar to ours in the case where the
domain includes nonquasi-linear preferences but objects are homogeneous. They generalize
VCG-type rules by employing compensating valuations, and characterize the generalized
VCG-type rules by the four desirable properties.9 We stress that when preferences are not
quasi-linear, the heterogeneity of objects makes the MPW rule substantially di®erent from
the generalized VCG rule. In Section 2, we illustrate the MPW rule for simple cases, and
contrast it with the VCG-type rule.
Although the assumption of quasi-linearity neglects the serious e®ects of large-scale auc-
tion payments of auctions in actual practice, it is di±cult to investigate the above question
without this assumption. Quasi-linearity simpli¯es the description of Pareto-e±cient alloca-
tions. More precisely, under quasi-linear preferences, a Pareto-e±cient allocation of objects
can be achieved simply by maximizing the sum of realized bene¯ts from objects (agents' net
bene¯ts), and hence, e±cient allocations of objects are independent of how much agents pay.
In this sense, HolmstrÄom (1979) characterizes only the payment part of strategy-proof and
Pareto-e±cient rules. On the other hand, without quasi-linearity, Pareto-e±cient alloca-
tions of objects do depend on payments, and thus are complicated to identify. Moreover,
we illustrate this point in Section 2 in more detail. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, on
nonquasi-linear domains, the MPW rule is rather di®erent from the VCG rule, and the for-
mer outperforms the latter in terms of our desirable properties. Therefore, the extension of
HolmstrÄom's (1979) result to nonquasi-linear domains is far from trivial. Needless to say,
HolmstrÄom's (1979) proof techniques fail when the domain includes nonquasi-linear prefer-
6See Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), and Vickrey (1961).
7More precisely, HolmstrÄom (1979) studies public goods models. When agents have quasi-linear prefer-
ences, his result can be applied to the auction model.
8Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) also discuss the importance of the analysis under nonquasi-linear preferences.
9Sakai (2008) also obtains a result similar to theirs.
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ences. It is worthwhile to mention that most standard results of auction theory, such as the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem, also depend on assuming quasi-linearity. In this article, we
overcome that di±culty.
Related Literature. We relate our results to literature not referenced above. Analyzing
a model resembling ours, Miyake (1998) shows that only the MPW rule satis¯es strategy-
proofness among \Walrasian rules".10 Note that Walrasian rules are a small part of the
class of allocation rules satisfying Pareto-e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative
payment. By developing analytical tools substantially di®erent from Miyake's (1998), we
extend his characterization in that we establish the uniqueness of the rules satisfying the
desirable properties without con¯nement to Walrasian rules.
Many authors have analyzed SA auctions in quasi-linear settings. For example, see
Ausubel (2004, 2006); Ausubel and Milgrom (2002); de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2007);
Gul and Stacchetti (2000); and Mishra and Parkes (2007), etc. In nonquasi-linear settings,
MPW rules di®er from VCG rules, and it is the MPW allocation that coincides with the
outcome of the SA auction. Since our result states that only the MPW rule satis¯es ba-
sic desirable properties, it indicates that their works are more important in nonquasi-linear
settings.
Other related literature concerns matching models. The concept of stability in matching
models is equivalent to Walrasian equilibrium in our model. The \agent-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (APDAA)" in matching models without monetary transfers corresponds
to the MPW rule. Alcalde and Barberµa (1994) characterize the APDAA rule by strategy-
proofness among stable rules. Kojima and Manea (2010) characterize the APDAA rule
without imposing stability, but with di®erent properties, which they call individually rational
monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity. In a spirit akin to ours, those articles analyze
rules satisfying desirable properties.
Organization. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the minimum
price Walrasian rule, and demonstrates how nonquasi-linear preferences complicate analy-
sis. Section 3 sets up the model and introduces basic concepts formally. Section 4 de¯nes
Walrasian equilibria and characterizes them by the concepts of underdemanded and overde-
manded sets. Section 5 provides our main result. Section 6 de¯nes the SA auction, and
shows that its outcome coincides with the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
Section 7 gives an overview of the proof of our primary conclusion. Section 8 concludes. All
the formal proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 An illustration of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule
with Nonquasi-linear preferences
In this section, we illustrate the minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule in the simplest cases
when three agents (agents 1, 2, and 3) have varied preferences and there are only one or two
objects. In addition, we contrast the MPW rule with the Vickrey{Clarke{Groves (VCG) rule
to demonstrate their di®erence.
Case I: Quasi-linear domain. When agents have quasi-linear preferences, each agent's
10A \Walrasian rule" is the rule that assigns a Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference pro¯le.
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valuation of each object is independent of his payment, and the outcome of the MPW rule
coincides with that of the VCG rule. Under the two rules, the objects are allocated e±ciently
(i.e., the sum of agents' valuations is maximized), and each agent pays the social opportunity
cost of allocating to him the object he receives. It is known that this rule is a unique rule
satisfying e±ciency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality (HolmstrÄom, 1979; Chew
and Serizawa, 2007).
Case II: Nonquasi-linear domain (one-object case). When preferences are not quasi-
linear, agents' valuations of objects are not de¯ned independently of their payments. How-
ever, when there is only one object, the MPW rule still coincides with a simple generalization
of the VCG rule based on compensating valuations from the origin of an agent's consumption
space,11 which we call \the VCG rule from 0".
Consider the case where agents preferences, R1, R2, and R3 are depicted in Figure 1, where
Ri (i = 1; 2; 3) denotes agent i's preference, and zi denotes i's consumption point assigned
by the MPW rule. Denote the highest and second highest compensating valuations from the
origin 0 among agents by CV 1(0) and CV 2(0), respectively. Under the two rules, the agent
with the highest compensating valuation CV 1(0) receives the object and pays CV 2(0).
This rule can easily be extended to the case with n agents and m homogeneous objects.
In this case, agents with m highest compensating valuations receive the objects and pay the
(m + 1)-th highest compensating valuation. While objects are homogeneous, this is also a
unique rule satisfying e±ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and nonnegative
payment (Saitoh and Serizawa, 2008; Sakai, 2008).
[Figure 1 about here]
Case III: Nonquasi-linear domain (two-object case, 1). We now illustrate the outcome
of the MPW rule when there are two heterogeneous objects, A andB. Consider the case where
agents' preferences, R1, R2, and R3 are depicted in Figure 2. Denote agent i's (i = 1; 2; 3)
compensating valuation of object x (x = A;B) from the origin 0 by CVi(x;0). Compensating
valuations are ranked as CV1(A;0) > CV3(A;0) > CV2(A;0) and CV2(B;0) > CV3(B;0) >
CV1(B;0). In this case, under the MPW rule, agent 1 receives object A and pays CV3(A;0),
and agent 2 receives object B and pays CV3(B;0). Note that each object is allocated to the
agent with the highest compensating valuation from the origin at the price established by
the second highest compensating valuation. This outcome still coincides with the outcome
of the VCG rule from 0 when it is applied to the two objects independently.
[Figure 2 about here]
Case IV: Nonquasi-linear domain (two-object case, 2). We next consider the case
where agents' preferences are depicted in Figure 3. The compensating valuations from the
origin are ranked as CV2(A;0) > CV1(A;0) > CV3(A;0) and CV1(B;0) > CV2(B;0) >
CV3(B;0). Denote agent i's (i = 1; 2; 3) compensating valuation of object x (x = A;B) from
his consumption point zi = (xi; pi) by CVi(x; zi), where xi is the object that agent i receives
and pi is his payment. In this case, the outcome of the MPW rule is as follows: Agent 1
11In our model, the origin of an agent's consumption space means that he receives no object and pays
nothing. Let 0 denote the origin of an agent's consumption space.
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receives object A and pays CV3(A;0), i.e., the price p
A of object A is CV3(A;0). This agent
1's consumption point is depicted as z1 in Figure 3. Agent 2 receives object B and pays
CV1(B; z1), i.e., the price p
B of object B is CV1(B; z1). This agent 2's consumption point is
depicted as z2 in Figure 3.
Let's see why this is the outcome of the MPW rule. First, note that for each agent
i = 1; 2; 3; zi is maximal for Ri in the budget set f0; (A; pA); (B; pB)g. Thus, the above
outcome is a Walrasian equilibrium. Next, let (p^A; p^B) be a Walrasian equilibrium price. If
p^A < pA, then, all agents prefer (A; pA) to 0, that is, all three agents demand A or B or
both. In that case, one agent cannot receive an object he demands, contradicting Walrasian
equilibrium. Therefore, p^A ¸ pA. If p^B < pB, both agents 1 and 2 strictly prefer (B; pB) to 0
and (A; pA). In that case, agent 1 or 2 cannot receive the object he demands, contradicting
Walrasian equilibrium. Therefore, p^B ¸ pB. Hence, the above outcome is of the MPW rule.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the above outcome is that of the SA auction. While
the price pA of object A is lower than CV3(A;0), no agent exits, and therefore the auction
does not stop. Thus, in the outcome, pA ¸ CV3(A;0). Similarly, pB ¸ CV3(B;0). If
pB < CV1(B; z1), then since p
A ¸ CV3(A;0), agents 1 and 2 both continue bidding on B.
Thus, pB ¸ CV1(B; z1). When pA = CV3(A;0) and pB = CV1(B; z1); agent 3 exits, and
agents 1 and 2 demand objects A and B, respectively. Then, the auction stops.
It is worthwhile to demonstrate that agent 2's compensating valuation of object A from
the origin is highest; however, he does not receive A, and that the price of object B is not
any agent's compensating valuation of object B from the origin. Accordingly, the MPW
outcome does not coincide with the VCG rule from 0. Additionally, we demonstrate that
e±cient allocations of objects cannot be obtained simply by maximizing the sum of agents'
compensating valuations from the origin in this case.
[Figure 3 about here]
Case V: Nonquasi-linear domain (two-object case, 3). Finally, we consider the case
where agents' preferences are depicted in Figure 4. The compensating valuations from the
origin are ranked as CV1(A;0) > CV3(A;0) > CV2(A;0) and CV1(B;0) > CV2(B;0) >
CV3(B;0). In this case, the outcome of the MPW rule is as follows: Agent 1 receives object
A and pays CV3(A;0), i.e., the price p
A of object A is CV3(A;0). This agent 1's consumption
point is depicted as z1 in Figure 4. Agent 2 receives object B and pays CV1(B; z1), i.e., the
price pB of object B is CV1(B; z1). This agent 2's consumption point is depicted as z2 in
Figure 4. In this case, it is agent 1's preference that decided whether agent 2 or 3 receives an
object. In Figure 4, agent 1 prefers (A;CV3(A;0)) to (B;CV2(B;0)), and agent 2 receives an
object. However, if agent 1 prefers (B;CV2(B;0)) to (A;CV3(A;0)), agent 3 instead receives
an object.
Similar to above Case IV, it is easy to see why this allocation is the outcome of the MPW
rule, and coincides with the outcome of the SA auction. As in Case IV, the price of object
B is not any agent's compensating valuation of object B from the origin, the MPW outcome
does not coincide with the VCG rule from 0, and e±cient allocation of objects cannot be
obtained simply by maximizing the sum of agents' compensating valuations from the origin.
[Figure 4 about here]
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In the above ¯ve cases, we contrasted the MPW rule with the VCG rule. Outcomes
of the two rules coincide in Cases I, II and III, but not in Cases IV and V. The VCG
rule above employs only a small part of the information about agents' preferences (i.e.,
\compensating valuations from the origin"). On the other hand, the MPW rule employs
other information (i.e., \compensating valuations from various points"). As we show in the
remainder of this article, only the MPW rule satis¯es strategy-proofness, Pareto-e±ciency,
individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on the domain including nonquasi-linear
preferences. Thus, the information about compensating valuations from various points is
necessary to design rules satisfying the above four properties on this domain.
As Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986), etc., discuss and we show formally in Sec-
tion 6, the outcome of the SA auction always coincides with the minimum price Walrasian
equilibrium allocation.
3 The Model and De¯nitions
There are n agents and m objects, where 2 · n < 1 and 1 · m < 1. We denote the set
of agents by N ´ f1; : : : ; ng, and the set of objects by M ´ f1; : : : ;mg. Let L ´ f0g [M .
Each agent is permitted to receive one object at most. We denote the object that agent
i 2 N receives by xi 2 L. Object 0 is referred as the \null object", and xi = 0 means that
agent i receives no object. We denote the money that agent i pays by ti 2 R. For each
i 2 N , agent i's consumption set is L£R, and agent i's (consumption) bundle is a pair
zi ´ (xi; ti) 2 L£ R. Let 0 ´ (0; 0).
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation Ri on L£R. Let Pi and Ii
be the strict and indi®erence relation associated with Ri, respectively. Given a preference Ri
and a bundle zi 2 L£R, we denote the upper contour set and lower contour set of Ri at
zi by the sets UC(Ri; zi) ´ fz^i 2 L£R : z^iRi zig and LC(Ri; zi) ´ fz^i 2 L£R : ziRi z^ig,
respectively. We assume that a preference satis¯es the following properties:
Continuity: For each zi 2 L£ R, UC(Ri; zi) and LC(Ri; zi) both are closed.
Money monotonicity: For each xi 2 L and each ti; t^i 2 R, if t^i < ti, then, (xi; t^i)Pi (xi; ti).
Finiteness: For each ti 2 R, each xi; x^i 2 L, there is t^i 2 R such that (x^i; t^i)Ri (xi; ti).
Let RE be the class of continuous, money monotonic, and ¯nite preferences, which we call
the \extended domain". Given Ri 2 RE, zi 2 L£R, and yi 2 L, we de¯ne compensating
valuation CV i(yi; zi) of yi from zi for Ri by (yi; CVi(yi; zi)) Ii zi. Note that by continuity
and ¯niteness of preferences, CVi(yi; zi) exists, and by money monotonicity, CVi(yi; zi) is
unique. The compensating valuation for R^i is denoted by dCV i.
We introduce another property of preferences.
Desirability of objects: For each xi 2M and each ti 2 R, (xi; ti)Pi (0; ti).12
De¯nition 3.1. A preference Ri is classical if it satis¯es continuity, money monotonicity,
¯niteness, and desirability of objects.
12The following is a weaker condition of desirability of objects. A preference Ri satis¯es weak desirability
of objects if for each xi 2 M , (xi; 0)Pi 0. All the results in this article still hold if desirability of objects is
replaced by weak desirability.
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Let RC be the class of classical preferences, which we call the \classical domain". Note
that RC ( RE.
De¯nition 3.2. A preference Ri is quasi-linear if there is a valuation function vi : L! R+
such that vi(0) = 0, and for each zi ´ (xi; ti) 2 L£ R, and each z^i ´ (x^i; t^i) 2 L£ R,
ziRi z^i () vi(xi)¡ ti ¸ vi(x^i)¡ t^i:
We denote the class of quasi-linear preferences by RQ, which we call the \quasi-linear
domain".
An object allocation is an n-tuple (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 Ln such that for each i; j 2 N , if
xi 6= 0 and i 6= j, then xi 6= xj, that is, any two agents do not receive the same object. Let
X be the set of object allocations. A (feasible) allocation is an n-tuple z ´ (z1; : : : ; zn)
of bundles such that (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 X. Let Z be the set of feasible allocations. We denote
the object allocation and agents' payments under an allocation z^ by x^ ´ (x^1; : : : ; x^n) and
t^ ´ (t^1; : : : ; t^n), respectively.
Let R be a class of preferences such that R µ RE. A preference pro¯le is an n-tuple
R ´ (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 Rn. Given R ´ (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 Rn and N 0 µ N , let RN 0 ´ (Ri)i2N 0 and
R¡N 0 ´ (Ri)i2NnN 0 .
An allocation rule, or simply a rule, on Rn is a function f from Rn to Z. Given a rule
f and a preference pro¯le R 2 Rn, we denote agent i's assignment of objects under f at R
by fxi (R) and i's payment under f at R by f
t
i (R), and we write
fi(R) ´ (fxi (R); f ti (R)); f(R) ´ (f1(R); : : : ; fn(R)); and f¡i(R) ´ fj(R)j2Nnfig.
We introduce basic properties of rules. The e±ciency condition de¯ned below takes the
auctioneer's preference into account and assumes that he is indi®erent to the auctioned
objects, that is, he is only interested in his revenue. An allocation z 2 Z is Pareto-e±cient
for R 2 Rn if there is no feasible allocation z^ 2 Z such that
(i)
X
i2N
t^i ¸
X
i2N
ti, (ii) for each i 2 N; z^iRi zi, and (iii) for some j 2 N; z^j Pi zj:
For each R 2 Rn, let P (R) be the set of Pareto-e±cient allocations for R.
E±ciency: For each R 2 Rn, f(R) 2 P (R).
Individual rationality de¯ned below requires that a rule should never assign an alloca-
tion which makes some agent worse o® than he would be if he had received no object and
paid nothing. Nonnegative payment requires that the payment of agents always should be
nonnegative.
Individual rationality: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N , fi(R)Ri 0.
Nonnegative payment: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N , f ti (R) ¸ 0.
The two properties below are of incentive-compatibility. The ¯rst says that by misrepre-
senting his preferences, no agent should obtain an assignment that he prefers.
Strategy-proofness: For each R 2 Rn, each i 2 N , and each R^i 2 R, fi(R)Ri fi(R^i; R¡i).
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The second is a stronger property: by misrepresenting their preferences, no group of
agents should obtain assignments that they prefer.
Group strategy-proofness: For each R 2 Rn and each N^ µ N , there is no R^N^ 2 R#N^
such that for each i 2 N^ , fi(R^N^ ; R¡N^)Pi fi(R).13
4 Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium
We de¯ne \Walrasian equilibrium" and \minimum price Walrasian equilibrium" in this
model. As Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986), etc., explain, and we show in Section
6, the minimum price Walrasian equilibria coincide with the outcomes of SA auctions. Let
R µ RE in this section. All results in this section also hold on the classical domain RC .
Given a price vector p ´ (p1; : : : ; pm) 2 Rm+ of m objects, the budget set (or available
set) is de¯ned as B(p) ´ f(x; px) : x 2 Lg, where px = 0 if x = 0. Given Ri 2 R and p 2 Rm+ ,
agent i's demand set D(Ri; p) is de¯ned as D(Ri; p) ´ fx 2 L : 8 y 2 L; (x; px)Ri (y; py)g:
Next is the de¯nition of \Walrasian equilibrium".
De¯nition 4.1. Let R 2 Rn. A pair (z; p) 2 Z £ Rm+ of feasible allocation and price vector
is a Walrasian equilibrium for R if it satis¯es the following two conditions:
(WE-i) for each i 2 N , xi 2 D(Ri; p) and ti = pxi ;
(WE-ii) for each x 2M; if for each i 2 N; xi 6= x; then, px = 0:
Condition (WE-i) says that each agent receives the object he demands, and pays its price.
Condition (WE-ii) says that an object's price is zero if it is not assigned.
Fact 4.1. For each R 2 Rn, there is a Walrasian equilibrium for R.
Fact 4.1 is already proven in the literature. For example, see Alkan and Gale (1990).
Our model is a special case of their model. In Section 6, we give an alternative proof of the
existence of Walrasian equilibrium as Proposition 6.1 by using the SA auction.
Given R 2 Rn, let W (R) be the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations for R,
that is, z 2 W (R) if and only if there is a price vector p 2 Rm+ such that the pair (z; p) is a
Walrasian equilibrium for R. Fact 4.2 below is so-called First Welfare Theorem.
Fact 4.2. Let R 2 Rn and z 2 W (R). Then, z is Pareto-e±cient for R.14
Fact 4.3 below says that for each preference pro¯le, there is a minimum price Walrasian
equilibrium.
13Let #A denote the cardinality of set A.
14To see this, suppose that z ´ (z1; : : : ; zn) is not Pareto-e±cient for R. Then, there is z^ ´ (z^1; : : : ; z^n)
such that
(i)
X
i2N
t^i ¸
X
i2N
ti; (ii) for each i 2 N; z^iRi zi; (iii) for some j 2 N; z^j Pj zj :
Since z 2 W (R), there is a price vector p 2 Rm+ such that (z; p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for R. Then,
by (ii) and (WE-i), for each i 2 N , t^i · px^i . By (iii) and (WE-i), t^j < px^j . Thus,
P
i2N t^i <
P
i2N p
x^i =P
i2N ti. This contradicts (i).
9
Fact 4.3 (Demange and Gale, 1985). Let R 2 Rn. There is a Walrasian equilibrium
(zmin; pmin) 2 Z £ Rm+ for R such that, for each price vector p 2 Rm+ , if there is z 2 Z such
that the pair (z; p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for R, then for each x 2M , pxmin · px.15
Given R 2 Rn, letWmin(R) be the set of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
allocations for R. That is, z 2 Wmin(R) if and only if there is pmin 2 Rm+ such that the
pair (z; pmin) is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for R. By Facts 4.1 and 4.3, for each
R 2 Rn, the set Wmin(R) is nonempty. Although the correspondence Wmin is set valued, but
it is essentially single-valued. That is, for each R 2 Rn, each pair z; z0 2 Wmin(R), and each
i 2 N , zi Ii z0i.16 We denote the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R by pmin(R).
Next, we introduce the concepts of \overdemanded set" and \underdemanded set" (De-
mange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1986; Mishra and Talman, 2010). We relate these concepts to
Walrasian equilibria.
De¯nition 4.2. A set M 0 µM of objects is (weakly) overdemanded at p for R if
#fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) µM 0g (¸) > #M 0.
A set M 0 µM of objects is (weakly) underdemanded at p for R if
[8x 2M 0; px > 0] =) #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \M 0 6= ;g (·) < #M 0.
Fact 4.4 below is shown by Mishra and Talman (2010) under the assumption that prefer-
ences are quasi-linear. However, their proof does not depend on this assumption.
Fact 4.4 (Mishra and Talman, 2010). Let R 2 Rn. A price vector p is a Walrasian
equilibrium price for R if and only if no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects
is underdemanded at p for R.
Theorem 4.1 below is a characterization of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
by means of the concepts of overdemanded and weakly underdemanded sets. Mishra and
Talman (2010) ¯rst obtain the same conclusion on the quasi-linear domain. We emphasize,
in contrast to Fact 4.4, that Mishra and Talman's (2010) proof crucially depends on the
quasi-linearity. It relies on a simple fact that when preferences are quasi-linear, if a set M 0
of objects is weakly underdemanded at a Walrasian equilibrium (z; p); then all the prices of
M 0 can be slightly lowered by the same amount while maintaining the Walrasian equilibrium
conditions (WE-i) and (WE-ii). However, it is not true when preferences are not quasi-linear.
Theorem 4.1 below is a novel result in that point.
Theorem 4.1 is the key to obtaining all the important results introduced in the subsequent
sections, such as Theorem 5.1 in Section 5 and Proposition 6.1 in Section 6. As mentioned
earlier, we obtain the existence of Walrasian equilibrium as a byproduct of Proposition 6.1.
Thus, this theorem is also a key to the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. Let R 2 Rn. A price vector p is a minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R
if and only if no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects is weakly underdemanded
at p for R.
15They also show that for each preference pro¯le, there is a maximum price Walrasian equilibrium.
16An allocation z0 2 Z is obtained by an indi®erent permutation from z 2 Z if there is a permutation ¼
on N such that for all i 2 N , z0i = z¼(i) and z0i Ii zi (Tadenuma and Thomson, 1991). Note that for each pair
z; z0 2Wmin(R), z0 is obtained by an indi®erent permutation from z.
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The following structures of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium are obtained as a
corollary of Theorem 4.1. Corollary 4.1 says that if the number of objects is greater than or
equal to the number of agents, the price of some objects is 0. Corollary 4.2 says that each
object bearing a positive price is connected by agents' demands to the null object or to an
object with a price of 0.
Corollary 4.1 (Existence of Free Object). Let m ¸ n, R 2 Rn, and z 2 Wmin(R).
Then, there is i 2 N such that pximin(R) = 0.
Corollary 4.2 (Demand Connectedness).17 Let R 2 Rn and (z; p) be a minimum Wal-
rasian equilibrium price for R. For each x 2 M with px > 0, there is a sequence fikgKk=1
of K distinct agents such that (i) xi1 = 0 or p
xi1 = 0, (ii) xiK = x, and (iii) for each
k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, fxik ; xik+1g µ D(Rik ; p).
Proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 appear in the Appendix.
5 Main Results
In this section, we provide a characterization of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
by means of the properties of rules.
Let R µ RE. Let g be a rule such that for each R 2 Rn, g(R) 2 Wmin(R). Then, g is
called a selection from the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium, which we call a minimum
price Walrasian rule.
5.1 Properties of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule
We discuss the properties of the minimum price Walrasian rule. Let g be a minimum price
Walrasian rule on Rn. First, by Fact 4.2, for each R 2 Rn, g(R) is Pareto-e±cient for R. Let
R 2 Rn. Then, there is a price vector p ´ (p1; : : : ; pm) 2 Rm+ such that for each i 2 N , (a)
gi(R) 2 B(p), and (b) for each z^i 2 B(p), gi(R)Ri z^i. Let i 2 N . Note that, for each x 2M ,
px ¸ 0, and B(p) = f(0; 0); (1; p1); (2; p2); : : : ; (m; pm)g. Thus, by (a), gti(R) ¸ 0, and by
(b), gi(R)Ri 0. Therefore, the minimum price Walrasian rules satisfy e±ciency, individual
rationality, and nonnegative payment.
Fact 5.1 below was ¯rst shown by Demange and Gale (1985). By using Theorem 4.1 in
Section 4, we show this fact more directly in the Appendix.
Fact 5.1 (Demange and Gale, 1985). The minimum price Walrasian rules are group
strategy-proof.
5.2 Characterizations
In this subsection, we focus on the analysis in the case where each agent has a classical
preference and the number of agents exceeds the number objects. Remember that all results
established in Section 4 also hold in this case. Theorem 5.1 below is a main conclusion of
this article, a characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule.
Theorem 5.1. Let R ´ RC and n > m. A rule f on Rn satis¯es strategy-proofness,
e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment if and only if it is a minimum
price Walrasian rule: for each R 2 Rn, f(R) 2 Wmin(R).
17This structure is discussed by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) and Miyake (1998).
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Since the minimum price Walrasian rules are group strategy-proof, we obtain the following
as a corollary of Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.1. Let R ´ RC and n > m. A rule f on Rn satis¯es group strategy-proofness,
e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment if and only if it is a minimum
price Walrasian rule.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 is in the Appendix. In addition, we give an overview of the proof
in Section 7.
5.3 Independence of the Axioms
The only if part of Theorem 5.1 fails if we drop any of the four axioms. The following
examples establish the independence of the axioms in Theorem 5.1.
Example 1 (Dropping strategy-proofness). Let f be a rule that chooses a \maximum"
price Walrasian equilibrium allocation for each preference pro¯le. Then, the rule f satis¯es
e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment, but not strategy-proofness.
Example 2 (Dropping e±ciency). Let f be the rule such that for each preference pro¯le,
each agent receives no object and pays nothing. Then, the rule f satis¯es strategy-proofness,
individual rationality, and nonnegative payment, but not e±ciency.
Next, we introduce variants of Walrasian equilibrium, one with \entry fee". Let R 2 Rn
and t0 2 R. A pair (z; p) 2 Z £ Rm+1 of feasible allocation and price vector is a Walrasian
equilibrium with \entry fee t0" for R if (i) p
0 = t0 and for each x 2 M , px ¸ t0, (ii) for each
i 2 N and each y 2 L, (xi; pxi)Ri (y; py) and ti = pxi , and (iii) for each x 2 M , if for each
i 2 N , xi 6= x, then px = t0. Note that, by Facts 4.1 and 4.3, for each preference pro¯le
and each entry fee t0, there is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with entry fee t0.
Moreover, we remark that, by Fact 5.1, for each entry fee t0, any selection from the minimum
price Walrasian equilibrium with entry fee t0 is (group) strategy-proof.
Example 3 (Dropping individual rationality). Let t0 > 0. Let f be a rule that chooses
a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with positive entry fee t0 for each preference pro¯le.
Then, the rule f satis¯es strategy-proofness, e±ciency, and nonnegative payment, but not
individual rationality.
Example 4 (Dropping nonnegative payment). Let t0 < 0. Let f be a rule that chooses
a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with negative entry fee t0 for each preference pro¯le.
Then, the rule f satis¯es strategy-proofness, e±ciency, and individual rationality, but not
nonnegative payment.
6 Simultaneous Ascending Auction
In this section, we de¯ne a class of simultaneous ascending auctions, and show that they
achieve the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium. Let R µ RE.
De¯nition 6.1. Given R 2 Rn and p 2 Rm+ , a set M 0 µ M of objects is a minimal
overdemanded set at p for R if M 0 is overdemanded at p for R, and there is no M 00 (M 0
such that M 00 is overdemanded at p.
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Under a (continuous time) \simultaneous ascending auction", in each time, each bidder
submits his demand at a current price vector, and the prices of the objects in a minimal
overdemanded set are raised at a speed at least d > 0.
De¯nition 6.2. A simultaneous ascending (SA) auction is a function p^ from R+ £
Rm+ £Rn to Rm+ such that
(i) for each p 2 Rm+ , each R 2 Rn, and each x 2M , p^x(0; p; R) ´ 0,
(ii) there is d > 0 such that for each t 2 R+, each p 2 Rm+ , each R 2 Rn, and each x 2M ,
(ii-a) dp^x(t; p; R)=dt ¸ d if x is in a minimal overdemanded set at p for R, and
(ii-b) dp^x(t; p; R)=dt = 0 otherwise.
Remark 6.1. For each R 2 Rn, an SA auction p^ generates a price path p(¢) such that for
each x 2M and each t 2 R+,
px(t) =
Z t
0
dp^x(s; p(s); R)
ds
ds.
Proposition 6.1. For each preference pro¯le, the price path generated by any simultaneous
ascending auction converges to the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price in a ¯nite time.
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 6.1 says that for each R 2 Rn, the price
path p(¢) generated by an SA auction has a ¯nal time T such that for each t ¸ T , p(t) =
p(T ) = pmin(R), and at the ¯nal price p(T ); each agent receives an object from his demand.
Moreover, this proposition shows the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.
7 Overview of the proof of Theorem 5.1
We give an overview of the proof of Theorem 5.1. Since if part of the theorem follows from
the discussion in Subsection 5.1, we explain the proof of only if part of the theorem.
As we emphasized in Introduction, without quasi-linearity of preferences, e±cient alloca-
tions of objects depend on payments. Thus, it is di±cult to identify the object allocations of
the rules satisfying our desirable properties without knowing their payments. On the other
hand, it is also di±cult to identify the payments of the rules satisfying our properties with-
out knowing their object allocations. In this section, we discuss how we overcome those dual
di±culties.
Let R ´ RC and n > m. The proof consists of the following four parts.
PART 1. We show the four preliminary results below, which are repeatedly used in the
proof.
Lemma 5.1 below says that under individual rationality and nonnegative payment, when-
ever an agent does not receive any object, then the payment of the agent should be zero.
Lemma 5.1. Let f be a rule that satis¯es individual rationality and nonnegative payment
on Rn. Let R 2 Rn and i 2 N be such that fxi (R) = 0. Then, f ti (R) = 0.
Lemma 5.2 says that under e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment,
each object should be assigned to someone.
13
Lemma 5.2. Let f be a rule that satis¯es e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative
payment on Rn. Let R 2 Rn and x 2M . Then, there is i 2 N such that fxi (R) = x.
The next lemma says that given an allocation, if there is a pair fi; jg of agents such
that i prefers his own assignment to j's one, but j prefers i's assignment to his own, and
the di®erence between j's payment and i's compensating valuation (CV) of j's assignment of
objects from i's assignment is less than the di®erence between i's payment and j's CV of i's
assignment of objects from j's assignment, then there must be a Pareto-improvement.
Lemma 5.3. Let R 2 Rn, i; j 2 N , and z 2 Z with xi 6= 0. Assume that (a) 0 ·
tj ¡ CVi(xj; zi) < CVj(xi; zj)¡ ti. Then, there is z^ 2 Z that Pareto-dominates z at R.
Given a bundle zi ´ (xi; ti) 2 L £ R with xi 6= 0, let RNCV (zi) be the set of preferences
R^i 2 R such that for each y 2 L n fxig, dCV i(y; zi) < 0, that is, for each object except for xi,
the compensating valuation of R^i from zi is negative. We refer to the preferences in RNCV (zi)
as \zi-favoring".
Lemma 5.4 says that under strategy-proofness and nonnegative payment, given a prefer-
ence pro¯le R, for each agent who is assigned an object, if the agent's preference is changed
to a preference that is fi(R)-favoring, then his assignment remains the same.
Lemma 5.4. Let f be a rule that satis¯es strategy-proofness and nonnegative payment on
Rn. Let R 2 Rn and i 2 N be such that fxi (R) 6= 0. Let R^i 2 RNCV (fi(R)). Then,
fi(R^i; R¡i) = fi(R).
PART 2. We establish Proposition 5.1 below, which says that for each preference pro¯le, the
allocation chosen by the rule f satisfying strategy-proofness, e±ciency, individual rationality,
and nonnegative payment on Rn should (weakly) dominate the minimum price Walrasian
equilibrium allocations. This proposition implies that under the rule satisfying our properties,
the payment of each agent is at most the minimum Walrasian price. Thus, Proposition 5.1
derives stringent upper bounds of outcome payments of the rules even without knowing
their object allocations. It is a crucial step to overcome the dual di±culties in the proof of
Theorem 5:1.
Proposition 5.1.18 Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, e±ciency, individual ra-
tionality, and nonnegative payment on Rn. Let R 2 Rn and z 2 Wmin(R). Then, for each
i 2 N , fi(R)Ri zi.
To prove Proposition 5.1, we introduce some additional notations and three lemmas.
Given R 2 Rn, x 2M , and z 2 (L£R)n, let ¼x(R) ´ (¼x1 (R); : : : ; ¼xn(R)) be the permutation
on N such that CV¼xn(R)(x; z¼xn(R)) · : : : · CV¼x1 (R)(x; z¼x1 (R)). That is, ¼xn(R) is the agent
with the lowest compensating valuation of object x from z, ¼xn¡1(R) is the agent with the
second lowest compensating valuation of object x from z, and so on. For each k 2 N ,
let Ck(R; x; z) ´ CV¼xk (R)(x; z¼xk (R)). That is, Ck(R; x; z) is the k-th highest compensating
valuation (CV) of object x from z. We simply write Ck(R; x; (0; : : : ; 0)) as Ck(R; x).
Hereafter, we maintain the assumption that f is a rule on Rn, and that the rule f satis¯es
strategy-proofness, e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment.
The next lemma says that if an agent receives object x, then his payment is not less than
the (m + 1)-th highest CV of object x from the origin. Thus, the (m + 1)-th highest CV of
18This result also holds for any Walrasian equilibrium allocation z.
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each object from the origin is a lower bound for the payment of the agent who obtains the
object.
Lemma 5.5. Let R 2 Rn, i 2 N , and x 2 M be such that fxi (R) = x. Then, f ti (R) ¸
Cm+1(R; x).
By using Lemma 5.5, we obtain Lemma 5.6 below, which says that if an agent receives
object x, then his CV for object x from the origin is not less than the m-th highest CV of
object x from the origin. Lemma 5.6 says that an agent cannot be assigned an object x by
the rule unless CVi(x;0) ¸ Cm(R; x). For each object, this lemma restricts the candidates
of agents who obtain the object without knowing payments.
Lemma 5.6. Let R 2 Rn, i 2 N , and x 2 M be such that fxi (R) = x. Then, CVi(x;0) ¸
Cm(R; x).
Lemma 5.6 implies that if for any object other than x, an agent's CV from the origin is
less than the m-th highest, then he never receives an object other than x. Whether or not an
agent receives object x depends on his CV of object x from the origin. It is straightforward
from e±ciency that if an agent has the highest CV of object x from the origin, he receives
object x. Lemma 5.7 below gives a weaker su±cient condition that agent i receives object x.
Given R 2 RN , let ZIR(R) be the set of individually rational allocations, that is,
ZIR(R) ´ fz 2 Z : for each i 2 N; zi Ri 0g.
Lemma 5.7. Let R 2 Rn, x 2 M , and i 2 N be such that for each y 2 M n fxg,
CVi(y;0) < C
m(R; y). Let z 2 ZIR(R), CVi(x;0) > C1(R¡i; x; z), and fj(R)Rj zj for each
j 2 N n fig. Then, fxi (R) = x.
Now, we present an informal sketch of the proof of Proposition 5.1, but only for Case V
in Section 2 (Figure 4), to explain intuitions in the simplest way.
Sketch of proof of Proposition 5.1. (Figure 5) By individual rationality, f3(R)R3 z3.
Let i 2 N n f3g. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. By contradiction, suppose that
z1 P1 f1(R). Then, since t1 < CV1(A; f1(R)), there is a preference R^1 that satis¯es (1-a):dCV 1(B;0) < C3(R;B) and (1-b): t1 <dCV 1(A;0) < CV1(A; f1(R)).
Step 119: We show z2 P2 f2(R^1; R2;3). Suppose that f2(R^1; R¡1)R2 z2. By individual ratio-
nality, f3(R^1; R2;3)R3 z3. By (1-a), dCV 1(B;0) < C2(R^1; R2;3; B). By (1-b) and z 2Wmin(R),dCV 1(A;0) > C1(R2;3; B; z). Since z 2 ZIR(R^1; R2;3), Lemma 5.7 implies fx1 (R^1; R2;3) = A,
and so, by individual rationality, f t1(R^1; R2;3) ·dCV 1(A;0). However, by (1-b): dCV 1(A;0) <
CV1(A; f1(R)), f1(R^1; R2;3)P1 f1(R), which contradicts strategy-proofness.
Step 220: We derive a contradiction to conclude that f1(R)R1 z1. It follows from Step 1 that
t2 < CV2(B; f2(R^1; R2;3)), and so, there is a preference R^2 that satis¯es (2-a): dCV 2(A;0) <
C3(R^1; R2;3; A) and (2-b): t2 < dCV 2(B;0) < CV2(B; f2(R^1; R2;3)). For each i = 1; 2; 3, let
z^i ´ 0. Then, by individual rationality, (2-a), and (2-b), the assumptions of Lemma 5.7 hold
for the pro¯le (R^1;2; R3). Then, by Lemma 5.7, f
x
2 (R^1;2; R3) = B, and thus, by individual
19This step corresponds to Step 2-1 of Proof of Proposition 5.1 in the Appendix.
20This step corresponds to Step 2-2 of Proof of Proposition 5.1 in the Appendix. Here we derive a contra-
diction in a simpler way by using the assumption that m = 2.
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rationality, f t2(R^1;2; R3) ·dCV 2(B;0). However, by (2-b): dCV 2(B;0) < CV2(B; f2(R^1; R2;3)),
f2(R^1;2; R3)P2 f2(R^1; R2;3), which contradicts strategy-proofness.
[Figure 5 about here]
When there are more than two objects, by applying the similar argument, in Step 2, we
show that there is i 6= 1; 2 such that zi Pi fi(R^1;2; R¡1;2). Repeating this argument m times
inductively, we can also obtain a similar contradiction as in Step 2. ¤
PART 3. To prove Theorem 5.1, we introduce more four lemmas. The important steps of
PART 3 are to prove Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 5.11 below.
Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, e±ciency, individual rationality, and non-
negative payment on Rn. Given a Walrasian equilibrium allocation z, let RI(z) be the set of
preferences Ri 2 R such that for each i; j 2 N , zi Ii zj, that is, all the assignments under z
are indi®erent. We refer to the preferences in RI(z) as \z-indi®erent".
The next lemma says that given a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium (z¤; p), if a group
of agents change their preferences to z¤-indi®erent preferences, then, for the new preference
pro¯le, (a) z¤ is also a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation, (b) the allocation
chosen by the rule f (weakly) dominates z¤, and (c) an agent who does not obtain any object
demands the null object at the price p.
Lemma 5.8. Let R 2 Rn, z¤ 2 Wmin(R), p be the price vector associated with z¤, N 0 µ N ,
R^N 0 2 RI(z¤)#N 0, and R^ ´ (R^N 0 ; R¡N 0). Then, (a) z¤ 2 Wmin(R^), (b) for each i 2 N ,
fi(R^) R^i z
¤
i and (c) for each i 2 N , if fxi (R^) = 0; then 0 2 D(R^i; p).
Given p 2 Rm++ and R 2 Rn, let N(R; p) denote the set of demanders of the non-null
objects at the price p, that is, N(R; p) ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \M 6= ;g.
As discussed in Section 4, an important structure of the minimum price Walrasian equi-
libria is demand connectedness (Corollary 4.2). Lemma 5.9 below implies that the rule f
possesses a similar structure, although in a limited pattern. It is an important step to derive
the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations from the desirable properties. Lemma
5.9 says that given a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium (z¤; p) and a preference pro¯le
such that a group N 0 of agents have z¤-indi®erent preferences, if (9-i) the payments of the
agents outside N 0 are not less than the price p, and (9-ii) each agent in N 0 receives an object,
then (9-a) each agent demanding only the null object at the price p receives the null object,
and (9-b) an object obtained by a z¤-indi®erent agent is connected to the null object by the
demands of non z¤-indi®erent agents.
Lemma 5.9. Let R 2 Rn, z¤ 2 Wmin(R), and p be the price vector associated with z¤. Let
N 0 µ N with 1 · #N 0 · m; ¹RN 0 2 RI(z¤)#N 0 ; ¹R ´ ( ¹RN 0 ; R¡N 0) and N 00 ´ N(R; p) n N 0.
Assume that (9-i) for each i 2 N n N 0, and each x 2 M , if fxi ( ¹R) = x, then f ti ( ¹R) ¸ px,
and (9-ii) for each j 2 N 0, fxj ( ¹R) 6= 0. Then,
(9-a) for each j =2 N(R; p) [N 0, fxj ( ¹R) = 0, and
(9-b) there is a sequence fikgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (i) K 2 f2; : : : ;m+ 1g,
(ii) fxi1(
¹R) = 0, (iii) for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ik 2 N 00, and iK 2 N 0, and (iv) for
each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ffxik( ¹R); fxik+1( ¹R)g µ D(Rik ; p).
See Figure 6 for an illustration of (9-b).
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[Figure 6 about here]
In the proof of Lemma 5.9, we intensively use Theorem 4.1, which is a characterization
result of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium by the concepts of overdemanded and
weakly underdemanded sets introduced in Section 4.
We give an informal sketch of the proof of Lemma 5.9. Although we sketch the proof only
for two objects case, it can be easily generalized to any ¯nite objects case. In the Appendix,
we give a formal proof of Lemma 5.9 by using induction.
Sketch of proof of Lemma 5.9 for two objects case. First, we show (9-a). Suppose
that for some j =2 N(R; p) [N 0, x ´ fxj ( ¹R) 6= 0. Since agent j demands only the null object
at the price p, individual rationality implies f tj ( ¹R) · CVj(x;0) < px. This contradicts (9-i).21
We turn to the proof of (9-b). Since n > m, at least one agent receives the null object. By
Lemma 5.8-(a), z¤ is also a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for ¹R. Then, by Theorem
4.1, no weakly underdemanded set exists at p for ¹R. Thus, at least one agent who obtains
the null object demands the non-null objects at p under ¹R. By (9-ii), no z¤-indi®erent agent
receives the null object. Thus, N 001 ´ fi1 2 N 00 : fxi1( ¹R) = 0g 6= ;.
Let D1 ´ [
S
i2N 001 D(Ri; p)] n f0g. Since ; 6= N 001 µ N(R; p), D1 6= ;. By Lemma 5.2, for
each x 2 D1, there is i(x) 2 N nN 001 such that fxi(x)( ¹R) = x.
Assume that some agents in N 0 receive the object inD1, i.e., for some x1 2 D1, i(x1) 2 N 0.
Since x1 2 D1, there is i1 2 N 001 such that x1 2 D(Ri1 ; p). Let i2 ´ i(x1). Then, fi1; i2g
satis¯es conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of (9-b). By fxi1(
¹R) = 0 and Lemma 5.8-(c), (iv) of (9-b)
also holds. Thus, (9-b) holds in this case.
Next, we assume that (9-b-1): no agent in N 0 receives the object in D1, i.e., for each
x 2 D1, i(x) =2 N 0. By (9-ii), M nD1 6= ;. Let N 002 ´ fj 2 N 00 n N 001 : 9 i 2 N 001 s.t. fxj ( ¹R) 2
D(Ri; p)g. By (9-b-1) and (9-a), for each x 2 D1, i(x) 2 N 00 n N 001 . Thus, N 002 6= ;. Since no
two agents receive the same object, #D1 = #N
00
2 . Then, we can show that (9-b-2): there is
j 2 N 002 who demands the object in M nD1, i.e., D(Rj; p) \ (M nD1) 6= ;.22
Let D2 ´ [
S
i2N 002 D(Ri; p)] n (D1 [ f0g). By (9-b-2), D2 6= ;. By Lemma 5.2, for each
x 2 D2, there is i(x) 2 N n (N 001 [N 002 ) such that fxi(x)( ¹R) = x.
Note that, in two objects case, some agents in N 0 receive the object in D2, i.e., for
some x2 2 D2, i(x2) 2 N 0.23 Let i3 ´ i(x2). Since x2 2 D2, there is i2 2 N 002 such that
x2 2 D(Ri2 ; p). Thus, fxi3( ¹R) 2 D(Ri2 ; p). Since i2 2 N 002 , there is i1 2 N 001 such that
21Note that the proof of (9-a) does not depend on the assumption that m = 2.
22To see this, suppose that for each j 2 N 002 , D(Rj ; p) \ (M nD1) = ;. Then,
#
©
j 2 N : D( ¹Rj ; p) \ (M nD1) 6= ;
ª
= #N 0 +#N 00 ¡#N 001 ¡#N 002
= #M ¡#D1
= #M nD1,
where the ¯rst equality follows from #
©
j 2 N : D( ¹Rj ; p) \M 6= ;
ª
= #N 0 +#N 00, and for each k 2 f1; 2g
and each i 2 N 00k , D(Ri; p)\ (M nD1) = ;, and the second from #N 0+#N 00¡#N 001 = m and #D1 = #N 002 .
Thus, the set M nD1 is weakly underdemanded at p for ¹R. However, by Lemma 5.8-(a) and Theorem 4.1,
there is no weakly underdemanded set at p for ¹R. This is a contradiction.
23To see this, suppose that for each x 2 D2, i(x) =2 N 0. Then, by (9-b-1), for each x 2 D1 [D2, i(x) =2 N 0.
Since D1 6= ;, D2 6= ; and D1 \D2 = ;, in two objects case, we have D1 [D2 =M . However, by N 0 6= ; and
(9-ii), there is j 2 N 0 such that fxj ( ¹R) 6= 0. Thus, for some x 2 D1 [D2, i(x) 2 N 0, which is a contradiction.
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fxi2(
¹R) 2 D(Ri1 ; p). We show that fi1; i2; i3g satis¯es conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) in
(9-b) (see Figure 7).
Note that, by fxi1(
¹R) = 0 and Lemma 5.8-(c), ffxi1( ¹R); fxi2( ¹R)g µ D(Ri1 ; p). Finally,
we show that fxi2(
¹R) 2 D(Ri2 ; p). By contradiction, suppose that fxi2( ¹R) =2 D(Ri2 ; p). Let
y ´ fxi2( ¹R). Since x¤i2 2 D(Ri2 ; p), z¤i2 Pi2 (y; py). By Lemma 5.8-(b), fi2( ¹R)Ri2 z¤i2 . Thus,
fi2( ¹R)Ri2 z
¤
i2
Pi2 (y; p
y), which implies f ti2(
¹R) < py. This contradicts (9-i). Thus, (9-b) also
holds in this case.
[Figure 7 about here]
When there are more than two objects, we next consider the case where no agents in N 0
receives the object in D2. Applying a similar argument repeatedly, we can also show (9-b)
in Lemma 5.9 for more general cases. ¤
Lemma 5.10 below says that when an agent i receives object x and his CV of the null
object from his assignment is negative, for each agent j 6= i, if j's CV of object x from the
origin is greater than the di®erence between i's payment and i's CV of the null object from
his assignment, then agent j receives an object.
Lemma 5.10. Let R 2 Rn, i 2 N , and x 2M be such that fxi (R) = x and CVi(0; fi(R)) < 0.
Let j 2 N n fig. Assume that (10-i) ¡CVi(0; fi(R)) < CVj(x;0)¡ f ti (R). Then, fxj (R) 6= 0.
Next, we explain Lemma 5.11 below, which says that given a minimum price Walrasian
equilibrium (z¤; p) and a preference pro¯le such that a group N 0 of agents have z¤-indi®erent
preferences, if (11-i) for \any" z¤-indi®erent preferences of the group N 0, the payments of the
agents outside N 0 are not less than the price p, then the payments of the agents in N 0 are not
less than the price p. Thus, although in a limited pattern, this lemma derives stringent lower
bounds of outcome payments of the rules even without knowing their object allocations.
Lemma 5.11. Let R 2 Rn, z¤ 2 Wmin(R), and p be the price vector associated with z¤. Let
N 0 µ N . Assume that (11-i) for each ¹RN 0 2 RI(z¤)#N 0, each i 2 N nN 0, and each x 2M , if
fxi ( ¹RN 0 ; R¡N 0) = x, then f
t
i ( ¹RN 0 ; R¡N 0) ¸ px. Let R^N 0 2 RI(z¤)#N 0 . Then, for each i 2 N 0
and each x 2M , if fxi (R^N 0 ; R¡N 0) = x, then f ti (R^N 0 ; R¡N 0) ¸ px.
In the proof of Lemma 5.11, we derive a contradiction by showing that whenever the
payment of a z¤-indi®erent agent is less than the price p, there is another allocation that
Pareto-dominates the allocation chosen by the rule. To guarantee the existence of such
Pareto-improvements, we apply Lemma 5.9.
Let us explain how Lemma 5.9 works in the proof. Let R^ ´ (R^N 0 ; R¡N 0) be a preference
pro¯le such that the agents in N 0 have z¤-indi®erent preferences R^N 0 . Suppose that the
payment of a z¤-indi®erent agent i who obtains object x is less than the price px of object
x. Let ¹Ri be an \fi(R^)-favoring" and \z
¤-indi®erent" preference such that the di®erence
between i's payment and i's compensating valuation of the null object from i's assignment is
less than the price px, i.e., (11-ii) f ti (R^) ¡ CV i(0; fi(R^)) < px. Let ¹R ´ ( ¹Ri; R^N 0nfig; R¡N 0).
Then, since ¹Ri is fi(R^)-favoring, Lemma 5.4 implies fi( ¹R) = fi(R^). Since ¹Ri is z
¤-indi®erent,
the preferences ¹RN 0 of the group N
0 are also in RI(z¤)#N 0 . Then, (9-i) in Lemma 5.9 follows
from (11-i). Note that for each j 2 N 0 n fig, dCV j(x;0) = px. Thus, by (11-ii) and Lemma
5.10, for each j 2 N 0 n fig, fxj ( ¹R) 6= 0. Moreover, by fi( ¹R) = fi(R^), fxi ( ¹R) = x 6= 0. Thus,
(9-ii) in Lemma 5.9 also holds.
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Then, by lemma 5.9, there is a sequence fikgKk=1 of distinct agents satisfying conditions
(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) in (9-b). By (11-i) and Proposition 5.1, for each k < K; fxik(
¹R) = px(k),
where x(k) ´ fxik( ¹R). For simplicity, we focus on the case where (a) K = 4, (b) i = iK , and
(c) for each k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, agent ik's assignment under f at ¹R is depicted in Figure 8.
[Figure 8 about here]
Let z0 be the allocation such that for each k 2 f1; 2g, agent ik obtains ik+1's assignment
under f at ¹R, i3 and i4 receive z
0
i3
and z0i4 depicted in Figure 8 respectively, and the other
agents receive their own assignments under f at ¹R. Then, since f ti1(
¹R) = 0, f ti2(
¹R) = p1, and
f ti3(
¹R) = p2, agent i3 prefers z
0
i3
to his own assignment fi3( ¹R), but all the other agents are
indi®erent between the two assignments. Thus, z0 is a Pareto-improvement for the allocation
under f at ¹R. Applying a similar argument, we can also show the existence of such Pareto-
improvements for more general cases.
PART 4. We complete the proof of Theorem 5.1, that is, we show that if a rule f satis¯es
strategy-proofness, e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on Rn, then,
for each preference pro¯le, the allocation chosen by the rule f is a minimum price Walrasian
equilibrium allocation.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 5.1. We present an informal sketch of the proof of Theorem
5.1. Let R be a preference pro¯le, and let (z¤; p) be a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
associated with R.
Let ¹R be a pro¯le of z¤-indi®erent preferences. Then, for each object, the (m + 1)-th
highest CV from the origin is equal to the price p. Thus, by Lemma 5.5, for each object x,
the payment of an agent who obtains object x is not less than the price px. We replace the
preferences in ¹R by the original preferences in R one by one, and inductively show that for
each object x, the payment of an agent who obtains x is not less than the price px.
Step 1: We replace the preference ¹Ri in ¹R of an agent i by his original preference Ri. Then, if
agent i obtains an object x at the new pro¯le (Ri; ¹R¡i), then f ti (Ri; ¹R¡i) ¸ px. For otherwise
since ¹Ri is z
¤-indi®erent, fi(Ri; ¹R¡i) ¹Pi fi( ¹R), contradicting strategy-proofness. Then, Lemma
5.11 implies that the payments of the remaining agents are also not less than the price p.
Step 2: We replace the preference ¹Rj in (Ri; ¹R¡i) of an agent j 6= i by his original preferences
Rj. Then, if agent i obtains an object x at the new pro¯le (Ri;j; ¹R¡i;j), then f ti (Ri;j; ¹R¡i;j) ¸
px. For otherwise since ¹Ri is z
¤-indi®erent, Step 1 implies fi(Ri;j; ¹R¡i;j) ¹Pi fi(Rj; ¹R¡j), con-
tradicting strategy-proofness. Similarly, if agent j obtains an object x at the new pro¯le
(Ri;j; ¹R¡i;j), then f tj (Ri;j; ¹R¡i;j) ¸ px. Then, Lemma 5.11 implies that the payments of the
remaining agents are also not less than the price p.
...
Repeating this argument inductively, we conclude that, under the original preference
pro¯le R, the payment of each agent is not less than the minimum Walrasian equilibrium
price p. Together with Proposition 5.1, this implies that each agent receives an assignment
of objects in his demand set at the price p and pays its price. Thus, (WE-i) in De¯nition 4.1
holds. Since R ´ RC and n > m, the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price of each object is
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positive. Lemma 5.2 implies that each object is assigned to someone under the rule f . Thus,
(WE-ii) in De¯nition 4.1 also holds. Since p is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for
R, we conclude that f(R) 2 Wmin(R). ¤
8 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we considered the problem of allocating several heterogeneous objects among
a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent is permitted to receive
one object at most and has \nonquasi-linear" preferences. First, we extended the results of
Mishra and Talman (2010) on the quasi-linear domain to the domains including nonquasi-
linear preferences, that is, we established that on the extended domain, a price vector is a
minimum Walrasian equilibrium price if and only if no set of objects is overdemanded and no
set of objects is weakly underdemanded at the price (Theorem 4.1). Next, in the case where
the number of agents exceeds the number of objects, we established that on the domain of
classical preferences, the minimum price Walrasian rule is a unique rule that satis¯es strategy-
proofness, e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment (Theorem 5.1).
Since the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations can be achieved by conducting
the simultaneous ascending auctions (Proposition 6.1; Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1986;
etc.), our results provide an answer to the question: \what types of auction rules are desirable
for large scale auctions?", that is, the simultaneous ascending auctions should be employed
when agents' preferences are not necessary quasi-linear.
Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 4 (Theorem 4.1, and Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2)
Let R µ RE. To prove Theorem 4.1, we introduce the concept of \truncation"of a
preference, and show a remark, two lemmas, and a fact below.
Given Ri 2 R and di 2 R, the di-truncation of Ri is the preference R^i such that for
each zi 2 M £ R, dCV i(0; zi) = CVi(0; zi) + di. Given R 2 Rn, the d-truncation of R is
the preference pro¯le R^ such that for each i 2 N; R^i is the di-truncation of Ri.
Remark 4.1. Let Ri 2 R, di 2 R, and R^i be the di-truncation of Ri. Then, for each
zi; z^i 2M £ R, ziRi z^i if and only if zi R^i z^i.
Lemma 4.1. Let R 2 Rn and (z; p) be a Walrasian equilibrium for R. Let R^ be the d-
truncation of R such that for each i 2 N with xi 6= 0, di · ¡CVi(0; zi), and for each i 2 N
with xi = 0, di ¸ 0. Then, (z; p) is also a Walrasian equilibrium for R^.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Since (z; p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for R, (z; p) satis¯es (WE-i)
and (WE-ii) for R. Since (WE-ii) is independent of preferences, we show only (WE-i) for R^,
that is, that for each i 2 N and each y 2 L, (xi; pxi) R^i (y; py). Let i 2 N and y 2 L.
First, consider the case where xi 6= 0. If y 6= 0, then by Remark 4.1, (xi; pxi) R^i (y; py). If
y = 0, then by di · ¡CVi(0; zi), (xi; pxi) R^i 0 = (y; py).
Next, consider the case where xi = 0. If y = 0, then by (y; p
y) = 0 = (xi; p
xi),
(xi; p
xi) R^i (y; p
y). If y 6= 0, then by (xi; pxi)Ri (y; py) and di ¸ 0, (xi; pxi) R^i (y; py). ¤
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Lemma 4.2. Let i 2 N , Ri 2 R, di 2 R, and R^i 2 R be the di-truncation of Ri. Let
p; q 2 Rm+ x 2M , and y 2 L be such that x 2 D(Ri; p) and y 2 D(R^i; q).
(i) If qx < px and y 2M , then, (y; qy)Pi (x; px) and qy < py.
(ii) If qx < px and di · ¡CVi(0; (x; px)), then, y 2M , (y; qy)Pi (x; px), and qy < py.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of (i). Let qx < px and y 2 M . By y 2 D(R^i; q), (y; qy) R^i (x; qx). Since R^i is the
di-truncation of Ri, it follows from Remark 4.1 that (y; q
y)Ri (x; q
x). Thus,
(y; qy)Ri (x; q
x)Pi (x; p
x)Ri (y; p
y),
where the second preference relation follows from qx < px, and the third from x 2 D(Ri; p).
Thus, (y; qy)Pi (x; p
x). Also, (y; qy)Pi (y; p
y) implies that qy < py.
Proof of (ii). Let qx < px and di · ¡CVi(0; (x; px)). Then, dCV i(0; (x; px)) · 0, and so
(x; px) R^i 0. Thus,
(y; qy) R^i (x; q
x) P^i (x; p
x) R^i 0,
where the ¯rst preference relation follows from y 2 D(R^i; q), and the second from qx < px.
Then, (y; qy) P^i 0 implies that y 2 M . Thus, by (i) of Lemma 4.2, (y; qy)Pi (x; px) and
qy < py. ¤
Fact 4.5 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Let R 2 Rn, and let R^ be the d-truncation of
R such that for each i 2 N; di ¸ 0. Then, pmin(R^) · pmin(R).
We now proceed to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We ¯rst show if part of Theorem 4.1. Then, we prove only if part.
Proof of \IF" part. Assume that no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects
is weakly underdemanded at p for R. Then, by Fact 4.4, p is a Walrasian equilibrium price.
Suppose that there is a Walrasian equilibrium price q such that q · p and q 6= p. Without
loss of generality, assume that for each x 2M 0, qx < px, and for each x =2M 0, qx = px, where
M 0 ´ f1; : : : ;m0g and 1 · m0 · m.
SinceM 0 is not weakly underdemanded at p for R, there is N 0 µ N such that #N 0 > #M 0
and for each i 2 N 0, D(Ri; p) \M 0 6= ;. For each i 2 N 0; let yi 2 D(Ri; p) \M 0. Since for
each x 2M 0, qx < px, and for each x =2M 0, qx = px, it follows that for each i 2 N 0 and each
x =2 M 0, (yi; qyi)Pi (yi; pyi)Ri (x; px) = (x; qx). Thus, for each i 2 N 0, D(Ri; q) µ M 0. By
#N 0 > #M 0, this implies that M 0 is overdemanded at q. Since q is a Walrasian equilibrium
price, by Fact 4.4, this is a contradiction.
Proof of \ONLY IF" part. Let p be the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R.
Then, by Fact 4.4, no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects is underdemanded
at p for R. We show that no set of objects is weakly underdemanded at p for R. Suppose that
there is a setM 0 of objects that is weakly underdemanded at p for R, that is, for each x 2M 0,
px > 0, and #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \M 0 6= ;g · #M 0. Let N 0 ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \M 0 6= ;g.
Without loss of generality, assume that M 0 is minimum among the weakly underdemanded
sets at p for R, that is, no proper subset of M 0 is weakly underdemanded at p. Since
p is a Walrasian equilibrium price, there is an allocation z 2 Z such that for each i 2 N;
xi 2 D(Ri; p) and ti = pxi . Since no set of objects is underdemanded at p for R, #N 0 = #M 0.
Without loss of generality, let M 0 ´ f1; : : : ;m0g and N 0 ´ f1; : : : ;m0g.
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Step 1. For each i 2 N 0, xi 2M 0.
Proof of Step 1. Since for each x 2 M 0, px > 0, it follows from (WE-ii) that for each
x 2 M 0, there is i(x) 2 N 0 such that xi(x) = x. Then, by #N 0 = #M 0, for each i 2 N 0,
xi 2M 0. ¤
For each x 2M 0, let qx ´ maxffCVj(x; zj) : j 2 N nN 0g [ f0gg. Then, for each x 2M 0;
qx < px.24 Let R^m0+1 2 R be such that for each x 2 M 0, if qx > 0, dCV m0+1(x;0) = qx,
and if qx = 0, dCV m0+1(x;0) 2 (0; px). Consider the economy E 0 with objects M 0, agents
N 00 ´ N 0 [ fm0 + 1g, and their preference pro¯le (RN 0 ; R^m0+1). Let ¹zm0+1 ´ 0 and ¹zN 00 =
(zN 0 ; ¹zm0+1).
Step 2. (¹zN 00 ; p
M 0) is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E 0.
Proof of Step 2. Let (~zN 00 ; ~p) be the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium of E
0. Since
(¹zN 00 ; p
M 0) is a Walrasian equilibrium of E 0, ~p · pM 0 . Let M¡ ´ fx 2 M 0 : ~px < pxg. We
show that M¡ = ;. Suppose that M¡ 6= ;. Let N¡ ´ fi 2 N 0 : D(Ri; p) \M¡ 6= ;g.
Step 2.1. For each i 2 N¡, ~xi 2 M¡.
Proof of Step 2.1. Let i 2 N¡. Then, there is x 2 D(Ri; p) \M¡. Thus, x 2 M 0 and
~px < px. Since (~zN 00 ; ~p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for (RN 0 ; R^m0+1), ~xi 2 D(Ri; ~p). Then,
Lemma 4.2-(ii) implies that ~xi 2M 0 and ~p~xi < p~xi . Thus, ~xi 2M¡. ¤
Step 2.2. M¡ =M 0, N¡ = N 0, and #M¡ = #N¡.
Proof of Step 2.2. Since no two agents in N¡ receive the same object, Step 2.1 implies
#M¡ ¸ #N¡.
Suppose M¡ 6= M 0. Then, since M¡ ( M 0 and M 0 is minimum among the weakly
underdemanded sets at p for R, M¡ is not weakly underdemanded at p for (RN 0 ; R^m0+1).
Thus, since for each x 2 M¡, px > 0, we have #N¡ ¸ #M¡ + 1. This contradicts #M¡ ¸
#N¡. Thus, M¡ =M 0.
By the de¯nition of N¡, M¡ =M 0 implies N¡ = N 0.
Since M 0 is weakly underdemanded, #N 0 = #M 0. By the above results, #M¡ = #M 0 =
#N 0 = #N¡. ¤
Step 2.3. For each x 2M 0, ~px ¸ qx.
Proof of Step 2.3. Suppose that there is x 2 M 0 such that ~px < qx. Then, by ~xm0+1 2
D(R^m0+1; ~p) and ~p
x < dCV m0+1(x;0), ~xm0+1 2 M 0. By M¡ = M 0 and N¡ = N 0 (Step 2.2),
Step 2.1 implies that for each i 2 N 0, ~xi 2M 0. Since there are only m0 objects in M 0, this is
a contradiction. ¤
Let (z^; p^) 2 Z £ Rm+ be such that z^N 0 = ~zN 0 ; z^¡N 0 = z¡N 0 ; p^M 0 = ~p; and p^¡M 0 = p¡M 0 .
Step 2.4. (z^; p^) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the original economy with objects M; agents
N , and preference pro¯le R.
Proof of Step 2.4. By Step 2.3, for each y 2M 0, ~py ¸ qy. Let h 2 N nN 0. Then, for each
y 2 L, if y =2M 0, then
(x^h; p^
x^h) = (xh; p
xh)Rh (y; p
y) = (y; p^y),
24To see this, suppose that for some x 2 M 0; qx ¸ px. Then, there is j 2 N nN 0 such that (x; px) Rj zj .
Since xj 2 D(Rj ; p), x 2 D(Rj ; p). Thus, j 2 N 0. This contradicts j 2 N nN 0.
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where the preference relation follows from xh 2 D(Rh; p), and if y 2M 0, then
(x^h; p^
x^h) = (xh; p
xh)Rh (y; q
y)Rh (y; p^
y),
where the ¯rst preference relation follows from the de¯nition of qy, and the last from p^y =
~py ¸ qy. Thus, for each h 2 N nN 0, x^h 2 D(Rh; p^).
Let h 2 N 0. Then, for each y 2 L, if y =2M 0, then
(x^h; p^
x^h) = (~xh; ~p
~xh)Rh (xh; ~p
xh)Rh (xh; p
xh)Rh (y; p
y) = (y; p^y),
where the ¯rst preference relation follows from ~xh 2 D(Rh; ~p), the second from ~p · pM 0 , and
the third from xh 2 D(Rh; p), and if y 2M 0, then
(x^h; p^
x^h) = (~xh; ~p
~xh)Rh (y; ~p
y) = (y; p^y),
where the preference relation follows from ~xh 2 D(Rh; ~p). Thus, for each h 2 N 0, x^h 2
D(Rh; p^).
Since (z; p) and (~zN 00 ; ~p) both satisfy (WE-ii), (z^; p^) also satis¯es (WE-ii). Thus, (z^; p^) is
a Walrasian equilibrium for R. ¤
Remember that p is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R. However, since
M¡ 6= ;, p^ · p and p^ 6= p. This is a contradiction. Thus, M¡ = ;. This completes the proof
of Step 2.
Without loss of generality, let x1 ´ 1; : : : ; xm0 ´ m0. Denote by ¦ the set of the permu-
tations of M 0 and by fx(k)gm0k=1 its generic element. Given fx(k)gm0k=1 2 ¦; let fi(k)gm0k=1 be
such that
xi(1) = x(1); xi(2) = x(2); : : : ; xi(m0) = x(m
0),
and ft(k)gm0k=1 be such that
t(1) ·dCV m0+1(x(1);0); t(2) ´ CVi(1)(x(2); z0(1)); : : : ; t(m0) ´ CVi(m0¡1)(x(m0); z0(m0¡1)),
where for each k 2 f1; : : : ;m0g, z0(k) ´ (x(k); t(k)). We call such a pair fz0(k); i(k)gm0k=1 an
assignment sequence. See Figure A.1 for an illustration of assignment sequence.
[Figure A.1 about here]
Step 3. There is b < p1 such that for any assignment sequence fz0(k); i(k)gm0k=1 constructed
as above, and for k with x(k) = 1, t(k) < b.
Proof of Step 3. For any assignment sequence fz0(k); i(k)gm0k=1, since t(1) · qx(1) < px(1),
the following holds inductively: for each k ¸ 2,
(x(k); t(k)) Ri(k¡1) z0(k ¡ 1) Pi(k¡1) (x(k ¡ 1); px(k¡1)) Ri(k¡1) (x(k); px(k)),
and t(k) < px(k);
where the ¯rst preference relation follows from t(k) = CVi(k¡1)(x(k); z0(k ¡ 1)), the second
from t(k ¡ 1) < px(k¡1), and the third from x(k¡ 1) 2 D(Ri(k¡1); p). Since the cardinality of
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¦ is ¯nite (m0!), there is b < p1 such that for any assignment sequence fz0(k); i(k)gm0k=1, and
for k with x(k) = 1, t(k) < b. ¤
Let R^1 be such that (i) R^1 is the d1-truncation of R1, and (ii) b < dCV 1(x1;0) < p1.25
Consider the economy bE with objects M 0, agents N 00 ´ f1; : : : ;m0+1g, and their preference
pro¯le (R^1; R^m0+1; RN 0nf1g). Let (z^; p^) be a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium of the
economy bE.
Step 4. x^1 6= 0.
Proof of Step 4. Suppose that x^1 = 0. We use Claim 4.1 below. It implies that m
0 agents
(agents 2; : : : ;m0 + 1) receive m0 di®erent objects in M 0nfx1g. By #M 0 = m0, this is a
contradiction. Thus, proving Claim 4.1 completes Proof of Step 4.
Claim 4.1. The following sequences fi(k)g and fz0(k) ´ (x(k); t(k))g; k = 1; : : : ;m0, can be
constructed:
x(1) ´ x^m0+1, xi(1) = x(1), and t(1) ´ p^x(1), and
8k 2 f2; : : : ;m0g; x(k) ´ x^i(k¡1), xi(k) = x(k), and t(k) ´ CVi(k¡1)(x(k); z0(k ¡ 1)).
Furthermore, for each k 2 f1; : : : ;m0g, x(k) 6= 0, x(k) 6= x1, p^x(k) · t(k) and p^x(k) < px(k).
Proof of Claim 4.1. We prove by induction.
Part I. First, we show x(1) ´ x^m0+1 6= 0. Suppose x^m0+1 = 0. Then, since two agents (1
and m0+1) in N 00 receive no object and #N 00 = #M 0+1, there is x 2M such that for each
h 2 N 00, x^h 6= x. By (WE-ii), p^x = 0. Since dCV m0+1(x;0) > 0, (x; p^x) P^m0+1 0. This is a
contradiction since x^m0+1 = 0 and (z^; p^) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Thus, x(1) 6= 0.
Note that by Step 1, x(1) 6= 0 implies that agent i(1) with xi(1) = x(1) uniquely exists.
Thus, x(1); i(1), and t(1) are well-de¯ned.
Second, we show that x(1) 6= x1. Suppose that x(1) = x1. Then, by Step 3 and (ii) of
R^1, p^
x(1) ´ t(1) < b <dCV 1(x1;0), that is, (x(1); p^x(1)) P^1 0. Thus, by x^1 = 0, x^1 =2 D(R^1; p^).
However, since (z^; p^) is a Walrasian equilibrium of bE, this is a contradiction. Thus, x(1) 6= x1.
Third, by x(1) ´ x^m0+1 2 D(R^m0+1; p^), p^x(1) ·dCV m0+1(x(1);0) < px(1).
Part II (Induction argument). Let k 2 f2; : : : ;m0g. Assume that Claim 4.1 holds until
k ¡ 1. Since x(k ¡ 1) 2 D(Ri(k¡1); p), x^i(k¡1) 2 D(Ri(k¡1); p^), and p^x(k¡1) < px(k¡1), Lemma
4.2-(ii) implies that x(k) ´ x^i(k¡1) 6= 0 and p^x(k) < px(k).
Note that by Step 1, x(k) 6= 0 implies that agent i(k) with xi(k) = x(k) uniquely exists.
Thus, x(k), i(k), and t(k) are well-de¯ned.
If p^x(k) > t(k) = CVi(k¡1)(x(k); z0(k ¡ 1)), then
(x(k ¡ 1); p^x(k¡1))Ri(k¡1) z0(k ¡ 1)Pi(k¡1) (x(k); p^x(k)),
contradicting x(k) ´ x^i(k¡1) 2 D(Ri(k¡1); p^). Thus, p^x(k) · t(k).
We show x(k) 6= x1. Suppose that x(k) = x1. Then, by Step 3 and (ii) of R^1, p^x(k) ·
t(k) < b < dCV 1(x1;0). Thus, (x(k); p^x(k)) P^1 0. Then, by x^1 = 0, x^1 =2 D(R^1; p^). However,
since (z^; p^) is a Walrasian equilibrium of bE, this is a contradiction. Thus, x(k) 6= x1. ¤
25Note that d1 > 0.
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Step 5. We derive a contradiction to conclude that no set of objects is weakly underdemanded
at p for R.
Note that by (i) and (ii) of R^1, d1 > 0. Since (z^; p^) is a minimum price Walrasian
equilibrium for (R^1; R^j; RN 0nf1g), Step 2 and Fact 4.5 imply that p^ · pM 0 . Note that
(x^1; p^
x^1) R^1 0 I^1 (x1;dCV 1(x1;0)) P^1 (x1; px1);
where the ¯rst preference relation follows from x^1 2 D(R^1; p^), the second from the de¯nition
of compensating valuation, and the third from (ii) of R^1.
By Step 1 and 4, x1 6= 0 and x^1 6= 0. Since (i) of R^1, by Remark 4.1, (x^1; p^x^1)P1 (x1; px1).
Then,
(x^1; p^
x^1)P1 (x1; p
x1)R1 (x^1; p
x^1);
where the second preference relation follows from x1 2 D(R1; p). Thus, p^x^1 < px^1 .
By (i) and (ii) of R^1, R1 is the (¡d1)-truncation of R^1 and ¡d1 · 0 · ¡dCV 1(0; z^1).
Then, Lemma 4.1 implies that p^ is a Walrasian equilibrium price for (RN 0 ; R^j). However, by
Step 2, pM
0
is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for (RN 0 ; R^j). Since p^ · pM 0 and
p^x^1 < px^1 , this is a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Suppose that for each i 2 N , pximin(R) > 0. Then, for each i 2 N ,
xi 6= 0. Let ¹M ´ fx1; : : : ; xng. Then, # ¹M ´ #N . Since ¹M = fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \ ¹M 6= ;g,
¹M is weakly underdemanded at p for R. This is a contradiction to Theorem 4.1. ¤
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Let x 2 M be such that px > 0. Then, by (WE-ii) in De¯nition
4.1, there is j1 2 N such that xj1 = x. By Theorem 4.1, the set fxg is demanded at p by
at lease two agents, and so, there is j2 2 N n fj1g such that x 2 D(Rj2 ; p). If xj2 = 0 or
pxj2 = 0, then by letting i1 ´ j2 and i2 ´ j1, we obtain the desired conclusion. Thus, we
assume that xj2 6= 0 and pxj2 > 0. Then, the set fxj1 ; xj2g is demanded at p by at lease three
agents, and so, there is j3 2 N n fj1; j2g such that x 2 D(Rj3 ; p). If xj3 = 0 or pxj3 = 0,
then by letting i1 ´ j3, i2 ´ j2, and i3 ´ j1, we obtain the desired conclusion. Thus, we
assume that xj3 6= 0 and pxj3 > 0. Repeating this argument inductively, there is a sequence
fjkgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (a) xjK = 0 or pxjK = 0, (b) xj1 = x, and (c) for each
k 2 f2; : : : ; Kg, fxjk ; xjk¡1g µ D(Rjk ; p). For each k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, let ik ´ jK¡(k¡1). Then,
the desired conclusion follows from (a), (b), and (c). ¤
A.2 Proofs for Section 5 (Fact 5.1 and Theorem 5.1)
Proof of Fact 5.1. Let R µ RE. Let g be a minimum price Walrasian rule on Rn. By
contradiction, suppose that there exist R 2 Rn, N^ µ N; and R^N^ 2 R#N^ such that for
each i 2 N^ , gi(R^N^ ; R¡N^)Pi gi(R). Let z ´ g(R) and z^ ´ g(R^N^ ; R¡N^). Let p and p^ be
the equilibrium prices associated with z and z^, respectively. Without loss of generality, let
N^ = f1; : : : ; n^g. Let M+ ´ fx 2 M : 0 < pxg and m+ ´ #M^ . Note that, if n > m, then
n > m+, and if n · m, then by Corollary 4.1, m+ · n¡ 1 < n.
In this paragraph, we show that for each i 2 N^ , x^i 6= 0, and p^x^i < px^i . Let i 2 N^ . Note
that (x^i; p^
x^i)Pi (xi; p
xi)Ri 0, where the ¯rst preference relation follows from gi(R^N^ ; R¡N^)Pi gi(R),
and the second from xi 2 D(Ri; p). Thus, x^i 6= 0. Also, note that (x^i; p^x^i)Pi (xi; pxi)Ri (x^i; px^i),
where the last preference relation also follows from xi 2 D(Ri; p). Thus, (x^i; p^x^i)Pi (x^i; px^i)
implies that p^x^i < px^i .
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Note that, for each i 2 N^ , since 0 · p^x^i < px^i , x^i 2 M+. Then, if m+ < n^, more than
m+ agents receive the objects in M+, which is a contradiction. Thus, assume that m+ ¸ n^.
By Theorem 4.1, there is i0 2 N n N^ such that D(Ri0 ; p) \ fx^1; : : : ; x^n^g 6= ;. Without loss
of generality, let i0 ´ n^ + 1. Note that Rn^+1 itself is its dn^+1-truncation. Thus, by Lemma
4.2-(ii), x^n^+1 6= 0, and 0 · p^x^n^+1 < px^n^+1 . Thus, x^n^+1 2M+. Then, by Theorem 4.1, there is
i00 2 N nf1; : : : ; n^+1g such that D(Ri00 ; p)\fx^1; : : : ; x^n^+1g 6= ;. Without loss of generality, let
i00 ´ n^+ 2. Note that Rn^+2 itself is its dn^+2-truncation. Thus, by Lemma 4.2-(ii), x^n^+2 6= 0,
and 0 · p^x^n^+2 < px^n^+2 . Thus, x^n^+2 2M+. Repeat this argument (m+ ¡ n^+ 1) times. Then,
more than m+ agents receive the objects in M+. This is a contradiction. ¤
Next, we prove Theorem 5.1. Let R ´ RC and n > m. Let f be a rule satisfying
strategy-proofness, e±ciency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on Rn.
Part 1: Preliminary results (Proofs of Lemmas 5.1{5.4)
Proof of Lemma 5.1. By nonnegative payment, f ti (R) ¸ 0. By individual rationality,
f ti (R) · 0. Thus, f ti (R) = 0. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.2. By contradiction, suppose that for each i 2 N , fxi (R) 6= x. Then,
by n > m, there is j 2 N such that fxj (R) = 0. By Lemma 5.1, f tj (R) = 0. Let z^ 2 Z
be such that z^j ´ (x; 0) and for each i 2 N n fjg, z^i ´ fi(R). Then, since (x; 0)Pi (0; 0),
z^j Pj fj(R). Note that for each i 2 N n fjg, z^i Ii fi(R), and
P
i2N t^i =
P
i2N f
t
i (R). Thus, z^
Pareto-dominates f(R) at R, which contradicts e±ciency. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Let d ´ tj ¡CVi(xj; zi), and let z^ 2 Z be such that z^i ´ (xj; tj ¡ d),
z^j ´ (xi; ti + d), and for each k 2 N n fi; jg, z^k ´ zk. Then, since z^i = (xj; CVi(xj; zi)),
z^i Ii zi. By (a) and z^j = (xi; ti + tj ¡ CVi(xj; zi)), z^j Pj (xi; CVj(xi; zj)) Ij zj. Also, for each
k 2 N n fi; jg, z^k Ik zk, and
P
k2N t^k = tj ¡ d + ti + d +
P
k 6=i;j tk =
P
k2N tk. Thus z^
Pareto-dominates z at R. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.4. First, we show that fxi (R^i; R¡i) = f
x
i (R). Suppose not. Let x ´
fxi (R^i; R¡i). By strategy-proofness, fi(R^i; R¡i) R^i fi(R). Thus, f
t
i (R^i; R¡i) · dCV i(x; fi(R)).
Since R^i 2 RNCV (fi(R)), dCV i(x; fi(R)) < 0. Thus, f ti (R^i; R¡i) < 0, which contradicts
nonnegative payment.
Next, we show that f ti (R^i; R¡i) = f
t
i (R). Suppose that f
t
i (R^i; R¡i) < f
t
i (R). (The
opposite case can be treated symmetrically.) Then, fi(R^i; R¡i)Pi fi(R), which contradicts
strategy-proofness. ¤
Part 2: Proof of Proposition 5.1. (Proofs of Lemmas 5.5{5.7 and Proposition 5.1)
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Note that for each i 2 N , (x; 0)Pi (0; 0). Thus, Cm+1(R; x) > 0.
By contradiction, suppose that f ti (R) < C
m+1(R; x). Let R^i 2 RNCV (fi(R)) be such that (i)
¡dCV i(0; fi(R)) < Cm+1(R; x)¡ f ti (R). Then, by Lemma 5.4, fi(R^i; R¡i) = fi(R).
Since #fj 2 N n fig : CVj(x;0) ¸ Cm+1(R; x)g ¸ m, there is j 2 N n fig such that
CVj(x;0) ¸ Cm+1(R; x) and fxj (R^i; R¡i) = 0. By Lemma 5.1, f tj (R^i; R¡i) = 0. By (i) and
Lemma 5.3, there is z^ 2 Z that Pareto-dominates f(R^i; R¡i) at (R^i; R¡i), which contradicts
e±ciency. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.6. By contradiction, suppose that CVi(x;0) < C
m(R; x). Then, by
Lemma 5.5, Cm+1(R; x) · f ti (R). By individual rationality, f ti (R) · CVi(x;0). Then, by
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CVi(x;0) · Cm+1(R; x), f ti (R) = CVi(x;0). Since #fj 2 N : CVj(x;0) ¸ Cm(R; x)g = m,
there is j 2 N n fig such that CVj(x;0) ¸ Cm(R; x) and fxj (R) = 0. By Lemma 5.1,
f tj (R) = 0. Then, by CVi(x;0) < C
m(R; x) · CVj(x;0) and Lemma 5.3, there is z^ 2 Z that
Pareto-dominates f(R) at R, which contradicts e±ciency. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.7. (Figure A.2) By contradiction, suppose that fxi (R) 6= x. Then,
by Lemma 5.2, there is j 2 N n fig such that fxj (R) = x. Since fj(R)Rj zj, f tj (R) ·
CVj(x; zj) < CVi(x;0). By z 2 ZIR(R), for each y 2 M , CVj(y; zj) · CVj(y;0). Let
R^j 2 RNCV (fj(R)) be such that (i) ¡dCV j(0; fj(R)) < CVi(x;0) ¡ f tj (R), and (ii) for each
y 2 M n fxg, dCV j(y;0) = CVj(y;0). Then, by Lemma 5.4, fj(R^j; R¡j) = fj(R). Since
fxj (R^j; R¡j) = x, f
x
i (R^j; R¡j) 6= x. Next, we show that fxi (R^j; R¡j) =2M nfxg. Suppose that
there is y 2 M n fxg such that fxi (R^j; R¡j) = y. By (ii), Cm(R^j; R¡j; y) = Cm(R; y). Since
CVi(y;0) < C
m(R; y), CVi(y;0) < C
m(R^j; R¡j; y), which contradicts Lemma 5.6. Thus,
fxi (R^j; R¡j) = 0. By Lemma 5.1, f
t
i (R^j; R¡j) = 0. Then, by (i) and Lemma 5.3, there is
z^ 2 Z that Pareto-dominates f(R^j; R¡j) at (R^j; R¡j), which contradicts e±ciency. ¤
[Figure A.2 about here]
Proof of Proposition 5.1. We only show f1(R)R1 z1 since the case of any other agent
can be treated in the same way. If x1 = 0, then z1 = 0; and so, by individual rationality,
f1(R)R1 z1. Thus, we assume that x1 6= 0. Let N+ ´ fj 2 N : xj 6= 0g. Note that
#N+ = m.
By contradiction, suppose that z1 P1 f1(R). We prove Claim 5.1 below by induction.
(iv-(k + 1)) of Claim 5.1 induces a contradiction by the ¯niteness of N+.
Claim 5.1. For each k ¸ 0, there exist a set N(k + 1) of k + 1 distinct agents, say
N(k + 1) ´ f1; : : : ; k + 1g, and R^N(k+1) 2 Rk+1 such that
(i-(k + 1)) zk+1 Pk+1 fk+1(R^N(k); R¡N(k));
(ii-(k+1)) for each j 2 N(k+1) and each y 2Mnfxjg;dCV j(y;0) < Cn(R^f1;:::;j¡1g; R¡f1;:::;j¡1g; y);
(iii-(k + 1)) tk+1 <dCV k+1(xk+1;0) < CVk+1(xk+1; fk+1(R^N(k); R¡N(k))); and
(iv-(k + 1)) N(k + 1) ( N+,
where N(k) ´ f1; : : : ; kg.
Proof of Claim 5.1.
Step 1. Let k = 0 and N(1) ´ 1. By z1 P1 f1(R); (i-1) holds, and so, t1 < CV1(x1; f1(R)).
Note that for each y 2 M , Cn(R; y) > 0. Thus, there is R^1 2 R such that (ii-1): for each
y 2M n fx1g; dCV 1(y;0) < Cn(R; y); and (iii-1): t1 <dCV 1(x1;0) < CV1(x1; f1(R)):
Note that f1g µ N+. Suppose that f1g = N+. Since #N+ = m, m = 1. Thus, by
x1 6= 0, for each j 2 N n f1g; zj = 0. Since z 2 W (R), for each j 2 N n f1g, zj Rj z1, and so,
CVj(x1;0) · t1. Thus, by (iii-1), C1(R¡1; x1; z) · t1 <dCV 1(x1;0). By individual rationality,
for each j 2 N n f1g, fj(R^1; R¡1)Rj 0 = zj. Since z 2 ZIR(R^1; R¡1), Lemma 5.7 implies
that fx1 (R^1; R¡1) = x1. By individual rationality, f
t
1(R^1; R¡1) · dCV 1(x1;0). However, by
(iii-1), f t1(R^1; R¡1) < CV1(x1; f1(R)). Thus, f1(R^1; R¡1)P1 f1(R), which contradicts strategy-
proofness. Therefore, (iv-1): f1g ( N+.
Step 2 (Induction argument). Let k ¸ 1. As induction hypothesis, we assume that there
exist a set N(k) ¶ N(1) of k distinct agents, say N(k) ´ f1; : : : ; kg, and R^N(k) 2 Rk such
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that
(i-k) zk Pk fk(R^N(k)nfkg; R¡N(k)nfkg);
(ii-k) for each j 2 N(k) and each y 2M n fxjg; dCV j(y;0) < Cn(R^f1;:::;j¡1g; R¡f1;:::;j¡1g; y);
(iii-k) tk <dCV k(xk;0) < CVk(xk; fk(R^N(k)nfkg; R¡N(k)nfkg)); and
(iv-k) N(k) ( N+.
See Figure A.3 for an illustration of (i-(k + 1)), (ii-(k + 1)) and (iii-(k + 1)) for k = 1.
[Figure A.3 about here]
By (iv-k), N+ nN(k) 6= ;. The proof consists of the following two steps.
Step 2-1. There is k0 2 N+ nN(k) such that zk0 Pk0 fk0(R^N(k); R¡N(k)).
Proof of Step 2-1. By contradiction, suppose that for each j 2 N+nN(k), fj(R^N(k); R¡N(k))Rj zj.
First, we show that fxk (R^N(k); R¡N(k)) = xk. By (ii-k), for each y 2M n fxkg,
dCV k(y;0) < Cn(R^N(k)nfkg; R¡N(k)nfkg; y) = Cn¡1(R^N(k); R¡N(k); y) · Cm(R^N(k); R¡N(k); y):
Let z^ 2 Z be such that for each j 2 N n N(k), z^j ´ zj, and for each j 2 N(k), z^j ´ 0.
Then, z^ 2 ZIR(R^N(k); R¡N(k)). By the supposition of Step 2-1, for each j 2 N+ n N(k),
fj(R^N(k); R¡N(k))Rj zj ´ z^j. By individual rationality, for each j 2 N(k) [ (N n N+),
fj(R^N(k); R¡N(k)) Rj 0 = z^j.
Since z 2 W (R), for each j 2 N n N(k), CVj(xk; z^j) = CVj(xk; zj) · tk. By (ii-k), for
each j 2 N(k) n fkg,
dCV j(xk; z^j) = dCV j(xk;0) < Cn(R^f1;:::;j¡1g; R¡f1;:::;j¡1g; xk) · Cn(R; xk) · tk.
Thus, by (iii-k), C1(R^N(k)nfkg; R¡N(k); xk; z^) · tk <dCV k(xk;0).
Since the assumptions of Lemma 5.7 hold for the pro¯le (R^N(k); R¡N(k)) as above, Lemma
5.7 implies that fxk (R^N(k); R¡N(k)) = xk.
By individual rationality, f tk(R^N(k); R¡N(k)) · dCV k(xk;0). However, (iii-k) implies that
f tk(R^N(k); R¡N(k)) < CVk(xk; fk(R^N(k)nfkg; R¡N(k)nfkg)).
Thus, fk(R^N(k); R¡N(k))Pk fk(R^N(k)nfkg; R¡N(k)nfkg), contradicting strategy-proofness. ¤
Step 2-2. We complete the proof of Claim 5.1.
Proof of Step 2-2. Without loss of generality, let k+1 ´ k0 and N(k+1) ´ N(k)[fk+1g.
Then, N(k+1) ) N(k), and (i-(k+1)) follow from zk0 Pk0 fk0(R^N(k); R¡N(k)). By (i-(k+1)),
tk+1 < CVk+1(xk+1; fk+1(R^N(k); R¡N(k))). Also, for each y 2 M , Cn(R^N(k); R¡N(k); y) > 0.
Thus, there is R^k+1 2 R such that
tk+1 <dCV k+1(xk+1;0) < CVk+1(xk+1; fk+1(R^N(k); R¡N(k))),
and for each y 2Mnfxk+1g,dCV k+1(y;0) < Cn(R^N(k); R¡N(k); y). Let R^N(k+1) ´ (R^N(k); R^k+1).
Then, (ii-(k + 1)) and (iii-(k + 1)) follow from (ii-k).
By (iv-k) and fk + 1g µ N+, N(k + 1) µ N+.
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Finally, we show (iv-(k + 1)): N(k + 1) ( N+. Suppose that N(k + 1) = N+. Then,
#N(k + 1) = #N+ = m. Thus, for each j 2 N nN(k + 1), zj = 0.
By (ii-(k + 1)), for each y 2M n fxk+1g,
dCV k+1(y;0) < Cn(R^N(k); R¡N(k); y) = Cn¡1(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1); y) · Cm(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1); y):
Let z^ 2 Z be such that for each j 2 N , z^j ´ 0. Then, z^ 2 ZIR(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1)).
By individual rationality, for each j 2 N n fk+1g, fj(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1))Rj 0 = z^j. Since
z 2 W (R), for each j 2 N nN(k + 1), CVj(xk+1; z^j) = CVj(xk+1; zj) · tk+1. By (ii-(k + 1)),
for each j 2 N(k + 1) n fk + 1g,
dCV j(xk+1; z^j) = dCV j(xk+1;0) < Cn(R^f1;:::;j¡1g; R¡f1;:::;j¡1g; xk+1) · Cn(R; xk+1) · tk+1.
Thus, by (iii-(k + 1)), dCV k+1(xk+1;0) > tk+1 ¸ C1(R^N(k); R¡N(k+1); xk+1; z^), and the as-
sumptions of Lemma 5.7 hold for the pro¯le (R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1)). Lemma 5.7 implies that
fxk+1(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1)) = xk+1.
By individual rationality, f tk+1(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1)) · dCV k+1(xk+1;0). However, by (iii-
(k + 1)), f tk+1(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1)) < CVk+1(xk+1; fk+1(R^N(k); R¡N(k))).
Thus, fk+1(R^N(k+1); R¡N(k+1)) Pk+1 fk+1(R^N(k); R¡N(k)), contradicting strategy-proofness.
¤
Part 3: Proofs of Lemmas 5.8{5.11.
Proof of Lemma 5.8. First, we show (a). Let M 0 µ M . Since z¤ 2 Wmin(R), it follows
from Theorem 4.1 that (i) #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) µ M 0g · #M 0 and (ii) #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \
M 0 6= ;g > #M 0. Note that for each i 2 N 0, D(R^i; p) = L and for each j 2 N n N 0,
D(R^j; p) = D(Rj; p). Thus, for each i 2 N 0, D(R^i; p) *M 0 and D(R^i; p) \M 0 6= ;. Then,
#fi 2 N : D(R^i; p) µM 0g · #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) µM 0g · #M 0; and
#fi 2 N : D(R^i; p) \M 0 6= ;g ¸ #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p) \M 0 6= ;g > #M 0:
That is, no set of objects is overdemanded nor weakly underdemanded at p for R^. Thus, (a)
follows from Theorem 4.1. Then, (b) also follows from Proposition 5.1.
Finally, we show (c). Let i 2 N . By contradiction, suppose that fxi (R^) = 0 and 0 =2
D(R^i; p). Then, by Lemma 5.1, z
¤
i P^i 0 = fi(R^): This contradicts (b). ¤
Proof of (9-b) of Lemma 5.9. Let N 001 ´ fi 2 N 00 : fxi ( ¹R) = 0g. We show that (9-1-b):
N 001 6= ;. Since N 00 ´ N(R; p) nN 0, N 00 [N 0 = N(R; p). Thus, #N 00 +#N 0 ¸ #N(R; p). By
Lemma 5.8-(a), z¤ 2 Wmin( ¹R). Thus, by Theorem 4.1, there is no weakly underdemanded
set at p for ¹R, and so, #N(R; p) ¸ m + 1. Therefore, #N 00 + #N 0 ¸ m + 1. By (9-ii), for
each j 2 N 0, fxj ( ¹R) 6= 0. Thus, at least one agent in N 00 receives no object, that is, (9-1-b)
holds.
Since N 001 µ N(R; p), for each i 2 N 001 , D(Ri; p) \ M 6= ;. Thus, by (9-1-b), we have
(9-1-d): there is i1 2 N 001 such that D(Ri1 ; p) \M 6= ;.
Let N(1) ´ N 001 and D1 ´ [
S
i2N(1)D(Ri; p)]nf0g. Given k ¸ 2, let N 00k ´ fj 2 N 00nN(k¡
1) : fxj ( ¹R) 2 Dk¡1g, N(k) ´ N(k¡1)[N 00k , and Dk ´ [
S
j2N 00k D(Rj; p)]n[
S
j2N(k¡1)D(Rj; p)].
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We introduce Claim 5.2 below to show (9-b) inductively. Note that Assumptions (9-
(k ¡ 1)-b) and (9-(k ¡ 1)-d) of Claim 5.2 follow from (9-1-b) and (9-1-d) when k = 2, that
(9-k-b) implies N(k) ) N(k ¡ 1), and that Assumptions except for (9-(k ¡ 1)-a*) hold
recursively. Thus, for any k ¸ 2, as long as (9-(k ¡ 1)-a*) holds, Claim 5.2 is applied and
N(k) increases as k increases. Since N(k) µ N 00, and N 00 is ¯nite,26 there is k · m such that
(9-k-a*) does not hold. Let k be the ¯rst number that violates (9-k-a*) in this iteration.
By (9-k-b), for each k0 2 f1; : : : ; kg, N 00k0 6= ;. Since (9-k-a*) does not hold, there are
jk 2 N 00k and jk+1 2 N 0 such that fxjk+1( ¹R) 2 D(Rjk ; p). Then,
for each k0 2 f1; : : : ; k ¡ 1g, there is jk0 2 N 00k0 such that fxjk0+1( ¹R) 2 D(Rjk0 ; p).
To show that the sequence fjk0gk+1k0=1satis¯es (iv) of (9-b), we prove
for each k0 2 f1; : : : ; kg, fxjk0 ( ¹R) 2 D(Rjk0 ; p).
By j1 2 N 001 , fxj1( ¹R) = 0. Then, by Lemma 5.8-(c), fxj1( ¹R) 2 D(Rj1 ; p). Let k0 2 f2; : : : ; kg.
By contradiction, suppose that fxjk0 (
¹R) =2 D(Rjk0 ; p). Let y ´ fxjk0 ( ¹R). Then, by x¤jk0 2
D(Rik0 ; p), z
¤
jk0
Pik0 (y; p
y). By Lemma 5.8-(b), fjk0 (
¹R)Rjk0 z
¤
jk0
. Thus, fjk0 (
¹R)Rjk0 z
¤
jk0
Pik0 (y; p
y),
which implies f tjk0 (
¹R) < py. This contradicts (9-i) of Lemma 5.9.
Then, the sequence fjk0gk+1k0=1 satis¯es (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of (9-b). Thus, for the rest of
the proof of (9-b), we prove Claim 5.2 below.
Claim 5.2. Let k ¸ 2. Assume that
(9-(k ¡ 1)-a) for each i 2 N(k ¡ 2) and each j 2 N 0, fxj ( ¹R) =2 D(Ri; p),27
(9-(k ¡ 1)-b) for each k0 2 f1; : : : ; k ¡ 1g, N 00k0 6= ;,
(9-(k ¡ 1)-c) for each k0 2 f2; : : : ; k ¡ 1g, #N 00k0 = #Dk0¡1,28
(9-(k ¡ 1)-d) there is ik¡1 2 N 00k¡1 such that D(Rik¡1 ; p) \ [M n
S
k0·k¡2Dk0 ] 6= ;,29 and
(9-(k ¡ 1)-a*) for each i 2 N 00k¡1 and each j 2 N 0, fxj ( ¹R) =2 D(Ri; p).
Then,
(9-k-a) for each i 2 N(k ¡ 1) and each j 2 N 0, fxj ( ¹R) =2 D(Ri; p),
(9-k-b) for each k0 2 f1; : : : ; kg, N 00k0 6= ;,
(9-k-c) for each k0 2 f2; : : : ; kg, #N 00k0 = #Dk0¡1, and
(9-k-d) there is ik 2 N 00k such that D(Rik ; p) \ [M n
S
k0·k¡1Dk0 ] 6= ;.
Proof of Claim 5.2. First, (9-k-a) follows from (9-(k ¡ 1)-a) and (9-(k ¡ 1)-a*). By (9-
(k¡ 1)-d), there is ik¡1 2 N 00k¡1 such that D(Rik¡1 ; p)\ [M n
S
k0·k¡2Dk0 ] 6= ;. Thus, Dk 6= ;.
By Lemma 5.2, for each x 2 Dk, there is i(x) 2 N such that fxi(x)( ¹R) = x. Note that, by
(9-a), i(x) 2 N(R; p) [ N 0. By (9-k-a) and the de¯nition of N(k ¡ 1), for each x 2 Dk,
i(x) 2 N 00 nN(k ¡ 1). Thus, N 00k 6= ;. Then, (9-k-b) follows from (9-(k ¡ 1)-b).
Since fx( ¹R) 2 X, no two agents receive the same object i.e., for each x; y 2 Dk with
x 6= y, i(x) 6= i(y). Thus, #N 00k = #Dk¡1. Then, (9-k-c) also follows from (9-(k ¡ 1)-c).
Finally, we show (9-k-d). By contradiction, suppose that for each i 2 N 00k , D(Ri; p)\ [M nS
k0·k¡1Dk0 ] = ;. See Figure A.4 for an illustration of proof of (9-k-d).
[Figure A.4 about here]
26By (9-ii) of Lemma 5.9 and feasibility of object allocation, it should be #N 00 · m.
27De¯ne N(0) = ;. When k = 2, (9-(k ¡ 1)-a) holds vacantly.
28When k = 2, (9-(k ¡ 1)-c) holds vacantly.
29When k = 2, (9-(k ¡ 1)-d) requires that there is i1 2 N 001 such that D(Ri1 ; p) \M 6= ;.
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Then,
#
(
j 2 N : D( ¹Rj; p) \
"
M n
[
k0·k¡1
Dk0
#
6= ;
)
= #N 0 +#N 00 ¡#N 001 ¡
kX
k0=2
#N 00k0
= #M ¡
kX
k0=2
#Dk0¡1
= #
(
M n
[
k0·k¡1
Dk0
)
;
where the ¯rst equality follows from #
©
j 2 N : D( ¹Rj; p) \M 6= ;
ª
= #N 0 +#N 00, and for
each k0 2 f1; : : : ; kg and each i 2 N 00k0 , D(Ri; p) \
£
M nSk00·k¡1Dk00¤ = ;, and the second
from #N 0 +#N 00 ¡#N 001 = m and (9-k-c): for each k0 2 f2; : : : ; kg, #N 00k0 = #Dk0¡1.
Therefore, the set
£
M nSk0·k¡1Dk0¤ is weakly underdemanded at p for ¹R. However, by
Lemma 5.8-(a), z¤ 2 Wmin( ¹R), and so, by Theorem 4.1, there is no weakly underdemanded
set at p for ¹R. This is a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.10. Suppose that fxj (R) = 0. By Lemma 5.1, f
t
j (R) = 0. By assumption
(10-i), ¡CVi(0; fi(R)) < CVj(x;0)¡f ti (R). Then, by Lemma 5.3, there is z^ 2 Z that Pareto-
dominates f(R) at R, which contradicts e±ciency. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5.11. Let R^ ´ (R^N 0 ; R¡N 0). Without loss of generality, let N 0 ´
f1; 2; : : : ; n0g. We only show that if fx1 (R^) = x 2M , f t1(R^) ¸ px since we can treat similarly
the other agents in N 0. Let fx1 (R^) ´ x 2 M . By contradiction, suppose that f t1(R^) < px.
Let N 00 ´ N(R; p) nN 0.
Case 1. #N 0 ¸ m+ 1.
Since f t1(R^) < p
x, there is ¹R1 2 RNCV (f1(R^)) such that (ii) ¡CV 1(0; f1(R^)) < px¡f t1(R^).
Then, by Lemma 5.4, f1( ¹R1; R^¡1) = f1(R^). Note that for each j 2 N 0 n f1g,
¡CV 1(0; f1(R^)) < px ¡ f t1(R^) = dCV j(x;0)¡ f t1(R^),
where the inequality follows from (ii) and the equality from R^j 2 RI(z¤). Thus, by Lemma
5.10, for each j 2 N 0 n f1g, fxj ( ¹R1; R^¡1) 6= 0. However, since #N 0 ¸ m + 1, this is a
contradiction.
Case 2. #N 0 · m.
First, we show the following step.
Step 1. Let S µ N 0, ¹RS 2 RI(z¤)#S, and ¹R ´ ( ¹RS; R^¡S). For each i 2 N 0, let xi ´ fxi ( ¹R).
Assume that
(11-1-i) for each i 2 N 0, xi 6= 0,
(11-1-ii) for each i 2 S and each zi ´ (y; t) 2M £ R with t < py, ¡CV i(0; zi) < py ¡ t,
(11-1-iii) there is j 2 S such that f tj ( ¹R) < pxj , and
(11-1-iv) there is a sequence fikgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (i*) 2 · K · m + 1,
(ii*) fxi1(
¹R) = 0, (iii*) for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ik 2 N 00, and iK 2 N 0, and (iv*) for
each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ffxik( ¹R); fxik+1( ¹R)g µ D( ¹Rik ; p).
Then, (11-a) f tiK (
¹R) < pxiK , and (11-b) iK =2 S.
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Proof of Step 1.
Proof of (11-a). If iK = j, f
t
iK
( ¹R) < pxiK follows from (11-1-iii). Thus, let iK 6= j. By
Lemma 5.8-(b), f tiK (
¹R) · pxiK . By contradiction, suppose that f tiK ( ¹R) = pxiK . Let z0 2 Z
be such that
z0j ´ (0; CV j(0; fj( ¹R)));
z0iK ´ (xj; f tj ( ¹R)¡ CV j(0; fj( ¹R)));
for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g; z0ik ´ fik+1( ¹R); and
for each i 2 N n (fikgKk=1 [ fjg); z0h ´ fh( ¹R):
See Figure A.5 for the illustration of z0.
[Figure A.5 about here]
We show that z0 Pareto-dominates f( ¹R) at ¹R.
By the de¯nition of CV j(0; fj( ¹R)), z
0
j
¹Ij fj( ¹R).
Note that
z0iK
¹PiK (xj; p
xj) ¹IiK fiK (
¹R);
where the ¯rst preference relation follows from z0iK ´ (xj; f tj ( ¹R)¡ CV j(0; fj( ¹R))), (11-1-iii):
f tj ( ¹R) < p
xj , and (11-1-ii): ¡CV j(0; fj( ¹R)) < pxj ¡ f tj ( ¹R), and the indi®erence relation from
f tiK (
¹R) = pxiK and iK 2 N 0, which implies ¹RiK 2 RI(z¤).
Lemma 5.8-(b) and (11-i) imply that for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, f tik( ¹R) = pxik . Thus,
by (11-1-iv)-(iv*), for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, z0ik = fik+1( ¹R) ¹Iik fik( ¹R).
For each i 2 N n (fikgKk=1 [ fjg), by z0i ´ fi( ¹R), z0i ¹Ii fi( ¹R).
Note thatX
i2N
t0i = CV j(0; fj( ¹R)) + f
t
j ( ¹R)¡ CV j(0; fj( ¹R)) +
K¡1X
k=1
f tik+1(
¹R) +
X
i2Nn(fikgKk=1[fjg)
f ti ( ¹R)
= f tj ( ¹R) +
KX
k=2
f tik(
¹R) +
X
i2Nn(fikgKk=1[fjg)
f ti ( ¹R)
=
X
i2N
f ti ( ¹R);
where the last equality follows from (11-1-iv)-(ii*): f ti1(
¹R) = 0. Thus, z0 Pareto-dominates
f( ¹R) at ¹R, which contradicts e±ciency. ¤
Proof of (11-b). By contradiction, suppose that iK 2 S. By (11-1-i) and (11-1-iv)-(iii*),
xiK 6= 0. By Step 1-(11-a), f tiK ( ¹R) < pxiK . Let z0 2 Z be such that
z0iK ´ (0; CV iK (0; fiK ( ¹R)));
z0iK¡1 ´ (xiK ; f tiK ( ¹R)¡ CV iK (0; fiK ( ¹R)))
for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 2g; z0ik ´ fik+1( ¹R); and
for each i 2 N n fikgKk=1; z0i ´ fi( ¹R):
See Figure A.6 for the illustration of z0.
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[Figure A.6 about here]
We show that z0 Pareto-dominates f( ¹R) at ¹R.
By the de¯nition of CV j(0; fj( ¹R)), z
0
iK
¹IIK fiK (
¹R).
Lemma 5.8-(b) and (11-i) imply that for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, f tik( ¹R) = pxik . By
(11-1-iv)-(iv*), for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 2g, z0ik = fik+1( ¹R) ¹Iik fik( ¹R).
Note that
z0iK¡1
¹PiK¡1 (xiK ; p
xiK ) ¹IiK¡1 (xiK¡1 ; p
xiK¡1 ) ¹IiK¡1 fiK¡1(
¹R),
where the strict preference relation follows from iK 2 S, z0iK¡1 = (xiK ; f tiK ( ¹R)¡CV iK (0; fiK ( ¹R))),
(11-a): f tiK (
¹R) < pxiK , and (11-1-ii): ¡CV iK (0; fiK ( ¹R)) < pxiK ¡ f tiK ( ¹R), the ¯rst in-
di®erence relation from (11-1-iv)-(iv*): fxiK¡1 ; xiKg µ D( ¹RiK¡1 ; p), and the second from
f tiK¡1(
¹R) = pxiK¡1 .
For each i 2 N n fikgKk=1, by z0i = fi( ¹R), z0i ¹Ii fi( ¹R).
Note that
X
i2N
t0i = CV iK (0; fik( ¹R)) + f
t
iK
( ¹R)¡ CV iK (0; fiK ( ¹R)) +
K¡2X
k=1
f tik+1(
¹R) +
X
i2Nn(fikgKk=1)
f ti ( ¹R)
= f tiK (
¹R) +
K¡1X
k=2
f tik(
¹R) +
X
i2Nn(fikgKk=1)
f ti ( ¹R)
=
X
i2N
f ti ( ¹R);
where the last equality follows from (11-1-iv)-(ii*): f ti1(
¹R) = 0. Thus, z0 Pareto-dominates
f( ¹R) at ¹R, which contradicts e±ciency. ¤
Step 2. We derive a contradiction to conclude that f t1(R^) ¸ px.
Since f t1(R^) < p
x, there is ¹R1 2 RI(z¤) \RNCV (f1(R^)) such that
(11-1-a) for each z1 ´ (y; t) 2M £ R with t < py, ¡CV 1(0; z1) < py ¡ t.
Then, by ¹R1 2 RNCV (f1(R^)) and Lemma 5.4, f1( ¹R1; R^¡1) = f1(R^). Thus,
(11-1-b) fx1 ( ¹R1; R^¡1) = x 2M and f t1( ¹R1; R^¡1) < px.
Note that f1g µ N 0. Suppose that f1g = N 0. Since f1( ¹R1; R^¡1) = f1(R^) and fx1 (R^) =
x 6= 0, fx1 ( ¹R1; R^¡1) = x 6= 0. Then, by (11-i) of Lemma 5.11, it follows from (9-b) of Lemma
5.9 that there is a sequence fikgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (i) 2 · K · m + 1,
(ii) fxi1(
¹R1; R^¡1) = 0, (iii) for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ik 2 N 00, and iK 2 N 0, and (iv) for
each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ffxik( ¹R1; R^¡1); fxik+1( ¹R1; R^¡1)g µ D(R^ik ; p). Then, by Step 1 (11-b),
iK =2 f1g. Since f1g = N 0, iK =2 N 0, which contradicts (iii): iK 2 N 0. Thus, if f1g = N 0, we
obtain a contradiction.
Therefore, we assume that
(11-1-c) f1g ( N 0.
Induction argument:
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Let s ¸ 1 and N(1) ´ f1g. As induction hypothesis, we assume that there exist a set
N(s) ¶ N(1) of s distinct agents and ¹RN(s) 2 RI(z¤)s such that
(11-s-a) for each i 2 N(s) and each zi ´ (y; t) 2M£R with t < py, ¡CV i(0; zi) < py¡ t,
(11-s-b) for some j 2 N(s), fxj ( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) ´ x0 2M and f tj ( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) < px0 , and
(11-s-c) N(s) ( N 0.
Note that (11-s-a), (11-s-b), and (11-s-c) follow from (11-1-a), (11-1-b), and (11-1-c) if
s = 1.
We show that there exist a set N(s + 1) ) N(s) of s + 1 distinct agents and ¹RN(s+1) 2
RI(z¤)s+1 such that
(11-(s+ 1)-a) for each i 2 N(s+ 1) and each zi ´ (y; t) 2M £ R with t < py,
¡CV i(0; zi) < py ¡ t; and
(11-(s+ 1)-b) for some j0 2 N(s+ 1),
fxj0( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) ´ x00 2M and f tj0( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) < px
00
:
First, we show (11-(s+1)-a). Since ( ¹RN(s); R^¡N 0nN(s)) 2 RI(z¤)#N 0 , (11-s-b) and Lemma
5.10 imply that
(B-1) for each i 2 N 0, fxi ( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) 6= 0.
Then, by (11-i) of Lemma 5.11, it follows from (9-b) of Lemma 5.9 that there is a sequence
fikgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (i) 2 · K · m + 1, (ii) fxi1( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) = 0, (iii)
for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ik 2 N 00, and iK 2 N 0, and (iv) for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g,
ffxik( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)); fxik+1( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s))g µ D(R^ik ; p). Let xiK ´ fxiK ( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)).
Then, by Step 1-(11-a),
(B-2) f tiK (
¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) < pxiK .
Also, by Step 1-(11-b),
(B-3) iK 2 N 0 nN(s).
Next, let j0 ´ iK and N(s + 1) ´ N(s) [ fj0g. Then, by (B-3), N(s + 1) ) N(s). Also,
(B-1) and (B-2) imply that fxiK (
¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) 6= 0 and f tj0( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)) < pxj0 . Thus, there
is ¹Rj0 2 RI(z¤) \RNCV (fj0( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s))) such that
for each zj0 ´ (y; t) 2M £ R with t < py; ¡CV j0(0; zj0) < py ¡ t;
Thus, (11-(s+ 1)-a) follows from (11-s-a).
Next, we show (11-(s + 1)-b). By ¹Rj0 2 RNCV (fj0( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s))) and Lemma 5.4,
fj0( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) = fj0( ¹RN(s); R^¡N(s)). Then, by (B-1), fxj0( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) 6= 0. By
(B-2), f tj0(
¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) < pxj0 . Thus, (11-(s+ 1)-b) holds.
Since N(s) ( N 0 and j0 2 N 0, N(s + 1) µ N 0. Suppose that N(s + 1) = N 0. Since
( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N 0nN(s+1)) 2 RI(z¤)#N 0 , (11-(s+ 1)-b) and Lemma 5.10 imply that
(B-4) for each i 2 N 0, fxi ( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) 6= 0.
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Then, by (11-i) of Lemma 5.11, it follows from (9-b) of Lemma 5.9 that there is a sequence
fikgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (i) 2 · K · m + 1, (ii) fxi1( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)) = 0,
(iii) for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g, ik 2 N 00, and iK 2 N 0, and (iv) for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K ¡ 1g,
ffxik( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1)); fxik+1( ¹RN(s+1); R^¡N(s+1))g µ D(R^ik ; p).
Then, by Step 1-(11-b), iK =2 N(s+ 1). Since N(s+ 1) = N 0, iK =2 N 0, which contradicts
(iii): iK 2 N 0. Thus, if N(s+ 1) = N 0, we obtain a contradiction.
If N(s+1) ( N 0, we obtain a contradiction by repeating the induction argument (#N 0¡
#N(s+ 1)) times. ¤
Part 4: Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let R 2 Rn, z¤ 2 Wmin(R), and p be the price vector associated
with z¤. By Lemma 5.5, for each ¹R 2 RI(z¤)n, each i 2 N , and each x 2 M , if fxi ( ¹R) = x,
then, f ti ( ¹R) ¸ px. Next, we prove the following claim.
Claim 5.3. Let k 2 f1; : : : ; ng and Nk µ N be such that #Nk = k. Then, for each ¹R¡Nk 2
RI(z¤)#NnNk , each i 2 N , and each x 2M , if fxi (RNk ; ¹R¡Nk) = x, then, f ti (RNk ; ¹R¡Nk) ¸ px.
Proof of Claim 5.3. We prove Claim 5.3 by induction on k. Let k = 1. Let N1 µ N with
#N1 = 1. Let ¹R¡N1 2 RI(z¤)#NnN1 , i 2 N1, and x 2 M be such that fxi (RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) = x.
Suppose that f ti (RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) < p
x. Let ¹Ri 2 RI(z¤) and x^ ´ fxi ( ¹R). Then, since f ti ( ¹R) ¸
px^, fi(RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) ¹Pi fi( ¹R), which contradicts strategy-proofness. Thus, for each ¹R¡N1 2
RI(z¤)#NnN1 , each i 2 N1, and each x 2M , if fxi (RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) = x, then, f ti (RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) ¸ px.
Then, it follows from Lemma 5.11 that for each ¹R¡N1 2 RI(z¤)#NnN1 , each i 2 N nN1, and
each x 2M , if fxi (RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) = x, then, f ti (RN1 ; ¹R¡N1) ¸ px.
Let k 2 f2; : : : ; ng. As induction hypothesis, we assume that
C: for each Nk¡1 µ N with #Nk¡1 = k ¡ 1, each ¹R¡Nk¡1 2 RI(z¤)#NnNk¡1, each i 2 N , and
each x 2M , if fxi (RNk¡1 ; ¹R¡Nk¡1) = x, then, f ti (RNk¡1 ; ¹R¡Nk¡1) ¸ px.
Let Nk µ N be such that #Nk = k. Let ¹R¡Nk 2 RI(z¤)#NnNk , i 2 Nk and x 2 M be
such that fxi (RNk ;
¹R¡Nk) = x. Suppose that f
t
i (RNk ;
¹R¡Nk) < p
x. Let Nk¡1 ´ Nk n fig.
Let x^ ´ fxi (RNk¡1 ; ¹R¡Nk¡1). Then, by induction hypothesis (C), f ti (RNk¡1 ; ¹R¡Nk¡1) ¸ px^.
Thus, fi(RNk ;
¹R¡Nk) ¹Pi fi(RNk¡1 ; ¹R¡Nk¡1), which contradicts strategy-proofness. Thus, for
each ¹R¡Nk 2 RI(z¤)#NnNk , each i 2 Nk, and each x 2 M , if fxi (RNk ; ¹R¡Nk) = x, then,
f ti (RNk ;
¹R¡Nk) ¸ px. Then, it follows from Lemma 5.11 that for each ¹R¡Nk 2 RI(z¤)#NnNk ,
each i 2 N nNk, and each x 2M , if fxi (RNk ; ¹R¡Nk) = x, then, f ti (RNk ; ¹R¡Nk) ¸ px. ¤
By Claim 5.3, for each i 2 N and each x 2 M , if fxi (R) = x, then, f ti (R) ¸ px. By
Proposition 5.1, for each i 2 N , fi(R)Ri zi. Thus, for each i 2 N and each x 2 M , if
CVi(x; zi) < p
x, fxi (R) 6= x. Therefore, for each i 2 N , fi(R) 2 B(p) and fxi (R) 2 D(Ri; p).
Thus, f(R) satis¯es (WE-i) in De¯nition 4.1. Since R ´ RC and n > m, for each x 2 M ,
px > 0. By Lemma 5.3, for each x 2 M , there is i 2 N such that fxi (R) = x. Thus, f(R)
also satis¯es (WE-ii) in De¯nition 4.1. Since p is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price
for R, we conclude that f(R) 2 Wmin(R). ¤
A.3 Proofs for Section 6 (Proposition 6.1)
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Let R µ RE and R 2 Rn. Consider a simultaneous ascending
(SA) auction de¯ned in Section 6. By the de¯nition of the SA auction, the price path p(t)
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generated by the SA auction is nondecreasing with respect to time t. Next, for each x 2M ,
let p^x > C1(R; x). Then, each agent demands only the null object at the price vector p^, that
is, no overdemanded set exists at p^. Thus, the price path p(¢) is bounded above, that is, for
each t 2 R+, p(t) · p^. Note that the prices are raised at a speed at least d > 0. Thus, there
is a price vector p¤ such that the price path p(¢) generated by the SA auction converges to
the price vector p¤ in a ¯nite time.
Let T be the ¯nal time of the SA auction. We show that the ¯nal price p(T ) is a minimum
Walrasian equilibrium price for R. By the de¯nition of SA auctions, no overdemanded set
exists at the price p(T ). If no weakly underdemanded set exists at p(T ), then the desired
conclusion follows from Theorem 4.1. Thus, we show that no weakly underdemanded set
exists at p(T ). The proof consists of the following two steps.
Step 1. Let t0 2 (0; T ]. Assume that there is a setM 0 of objects that is weakly underdemanded
at p(t0). Let N 0 ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t0)) \M 0 6= ;g. Then, (6-a) #N 0 ¸ 2, and (6-b) there
exist t00 2 (0; t0) and M 00 ( M 0 such that N 00 ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) \M 00 6= ;g ( N 0 and
M 00 is underdemanded at p(t00).
Proof of Step 1. Since M 0 is weakly underdemanded at p(t0), for each x 2 M 0, px(t0) > 0
and #N 0 · #M 0. For each i 2 N , let z0i ´ (x0i; t0i) 2 D(Ri; p(t0)). Note that for each
i 2 N nN 0 and each x 2M 0, CVi(x; z0i) < px(t0). For each x 2M 0, let qx ´ maxffCVj(x; z0j) :
j 2 N n N 0g [ f0gg. Let e > 0 be such that for each x 2 M 0, qx < px(t0) ¡ e ´ px.
Let t00 ´ maxft 2 R+ : for some x 2 M 0; px(t) · pxg. Then, there is x0 2 M 0 such that
dpx
0
(t00)=dt > 0 and px
0
(t00) = px
0
. Since dpx
0
(t00)=dt > 0, there is a minimal overdemanded
set M^ at p(t00) including x0. See Figure A.7 for an illustration.
[Figure A.7 about here]
Let M^ 0 ´ M^ \M 0. Since x0 2M 0, M^ 0 6= ;. Let
N^ 0 ´ fi 2 N 0 : D(Ri; p(t00)) \ M^ 0 6= ; and D(Ri; p(t00)) µ M^g:
We show that #N^ 0 > #M^ 0. If M^ µM 0, then M^ 0 = M^ and for each i 2 N^ 0, D(Ri; p(t00)) µ
M^ 0. Since M^ is an overdemanded set at p(t00), the desired conclusion holds. Thus, we assume
that M^ *M 0. Let M^ 00 ´ M^ nM 0 and N^ 00 ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) µ M^ 00g. Then,
fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) µ M^g
=fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) µ M^ 00g [ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) \ M^ 0 6= ; and D(Ri; p(t00)) µ M^g
=N^ 00 [ N^ 0;
where the ¯rst equality follows from M^ 00 [ M^ 0 = M^ and M^ 00 \ M^ 0 = ;, and the second from
fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) \ M^ 0 6= ;g µ N 0. Note that for each x 2 M 0, qx < px · px(t00). Thus,
for each i 2 N nN 0 and each x 2M 0,
(x0i; p
x0i(t00))Ri (x0i; p
x0i(t0))Ri (x; qx)Pi (x; px(t00)).
Since M^ 0 µM 0, for each i 2 N nN 0, D(Ri; p(t00)) \ M^ 0 = ;. Thus, N^ 00 \ N^ 0 = ;. Then,
#N^ 00 +#N^ 0 = #fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t00)) µ M^g
> #M^ (M^ is an overdemanded set at p(t00))
= #M^ 00 +#M^ 0:
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Note that M^ 00 ( M^ . Since M^ is a minimal overdemanded set at p(t00), M^ 00 is not overde-
manded at p(t00), and so, #N^ 00 · #M^ 00. This implies that #N^ 0 > #M^ 0.
We show (6-a). Since M^ 0 6= ;, 1 · #M^ 0. By #N^ 0 > #M^ 0 and N^ 0 µ N 0, we have
1 · #M^ 0 < #N^ 0 · #N 0, and thus, #N 0 ¸ 2.
Next, we show (6-b). Let M 00 ´ M 0 n M^ 0. Since M^ 0 ( M 0,30 M 00 6= ;. By M^ 0 6= ;,
M 00 ( M 0. First, we show that N 00 µ N 0 n N^ 0, that is, for each i 2 N 00, i 2 N 0 and
i =2 N^ 0. Let i 2 N 00. Then, D(Ri; p(t00)) \M 00 6= ;. Since for each x 2 M 0, qx < px(t00)
and M 00 µ M 0, for each j 2 N n N 0, D(Rj; p(t00)) \M 0 = ;. This implies i 2 N 0. Since
M^ 0 = M 0 \ M^ implies M 00 = M 0 n M^ , D(Ri; p(t00)) \M 00 6= ; implies D(Ri; p(t00)) n M^ 6= ;.
Since N^ 0 µ fj 2 N : D(Rj; p(t00)) µ M^g, this implies i =2 N^ 0. Thus, N 00 µ N 0 n N^ 0.
Since #N^ 0 > #M^ 0 ¸ 1, #N^ 0 ¸ 2, and so, N 00 ( N 0. Finally, it follows from the
inequalities below that M 00 is underdemanded at p(t00).
#N 00 · #N 0 ¡#N^ 0 by N^ 0 µ N 0
< #N 0 ¡#M^ 0 by #N^ 0 > #M^ 0
· #M 0 ¡#M^ 0 by #N 0 · #M 0
= #M 00:
¤
Step 2. There is no weakly underdemanded set at p(T ).
Proof of Step 2. By contradiction, suppose that there is a set M1 of objects that is
weakly underdemanded at p(T ). Let N1 ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(T )) \ M1 6= ;g. Then,
by Step 1, #N1 ¸ 2, and there exist t1 < T and M2 ( M1 such that N2 ´ fi 2 N :
D(Ri; p(t1))\M2 6= ;g ( N1 andM2 is underdemanded at p(t1). SinceM2 is underdemanded
at p(t1), Step 1 also implies that #N2 ¸ 2, and there exist t2 < t1 and M3 ( M2 such
that N3 ´ fi 2 N : D(Ri; p(t2)) \ M3 6= ;g ( N2 and M3 is underdemanded at p(t2).
Repeating this argument inductively, there is a sequence fNkg ( N1 such that for each
k ¸ 2, #Nk < #Nk¡1 and #Nk ¸ 2. However, since N1 is ¯nite and for each k ¸ 2,
Nk ( N1, this is a contradiction. ¤
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Figure 5. Illustration of proof of Proposition 5.1 for Case V in Section 2.
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Figure 6. Illustration of (9-b) of Lemma 5.9 for K = 4.
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Figure A.3. Illustration of (i-(k+1)) and (ii-(k+1)) in the proof of Proposition 5.1
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Figure A.4. Illustration of (9-k-d) of Lemma 5.9 for the case of k = 3, m = 4,
n = 5, N ′′1 ≡ {i1}, N ′′2 ≡ {i2}, N ′′3 ≡ {i3}, and N ′ ≡ N \ {i1, i2, i3}. In this case,
D1 = {1}, D2 = {2}, and {j ∈ N : D(R¯j, p) ∩ [M \ (D1 ∪D2)] 6= ∅} = N ′.
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Figure A.5. Illustration of z′ in (11-a) of Lemma 5.11 for K = 4.
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Figure A.6. Illustration of z′ in (11-b) of Lemma 5.11 for K = 4.
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Figure A.7. Illustration of proof of Step 1 of Proposition 6.1 for the case of m = 4,
M ′ ≡ {1, 2, 3}, N ′ ≡ {1, 2, 3}, x′ ≡ 2, and Mˆ ′ ≡ {2, 4}. In this case, Mˆ ′ = {2},
Nˆ ′ = {2, 3}, Mˆ ′′ = {4}, Nˆ ′′ = {4}, M ′′ = {1, 3}, and N ′′ = {1}.
